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Chapter 1
Introduction
When we look at the first rounds of an experiment, the large differences and variance among
individual performances might be driven by a lack of experience and results tend to overestimate
this heterogeneity. An experiment based on many rounds helps participants to adapt and improve
decisions, both in strategic and non-strategic games; additionally, some individuals may be
unaccustomed to a specific game and need some time to understand properly the task and their
best (individual) strategy to apply.
This dissertation focuses, in four chapters, on adaptation dynamics and experience in
strategic games and individual decision games. In particular, the role of experience through
time that helps agents to improve their performances in accordance with their preferences.
Game repetition allows agents to fill the gap of experience in specific tasks, improving their
performances and individual self-confidence. In this sense this dissertation aims to explore
different experimental settings in which individuals, playing repeatedly the same task through
the whole experiment, are able to become more sophisticated compared to early performances.
Two chapters focus on strategic behavior in a bargaining problem, in particular we compare
how participants change their behavior through time. Chapter 2 analyzes the first round of
a modified version of the Acquiring-a-Company game, where unexperienced individuals are
asked to trade over a firm. We explore gender differences in "make- up" and "suspicion": we
mainly find an effect of gender constellation such that when female sellers are aware to confront
a female buyer, they "make-up" more.
Chapter 3 considers the same subjects after playing 31 rounds of the game. Participants
are allowed to switch their payment method through which they will be paid at the end of the
experiment. Gaining experience (the analysis was carry out in our companion paper Di Cagno
et al. 2015) changes the strategic behavior of individuals yielding to a more homogeneous
approach to the game , but the incentive scheme, endogenously selected, make them performing
according to their individual preferences. We study the individuals’ determinants of switching
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into a specific payment scheme taking advantage of the availability of the past history of
behavior and performance in past rounds, as well as background information on individual
characteristics. Second, we investigate whether the chosen payment scheme affects behavior
and outcomes.
Gender differences, discussed both in Chapter 2 and 3 tend to disappear through time,
women become more sophisticated improving their trading strategies and selecting efficiently
the payment scheme.
Chapter 4 focuses on the individual adaptation dynamics in a Hybrid Public Good game,
in particular the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good in the role of
"leader" or "follower". In our design, each participant chooses an independent contribution
as well as adjusted contributions depending on how the other’s independent contribution
qualitatively compares with the own one. We consider different adjust-probability levels: low
(p = 2.5%), middle (p = 33%), and high (p = 49%). When the probability p of adjustment
is low, it is very unlikely that either contributor can adjust, hence the situation is close to a
standard public good game with free riding being dominant. As p increases it becomes more
likely that one will be able to adjust and the nature of the game gets closer to a trust game. We
include two treatments differing in the way contributions can be adjusted: a Pure Adjustment
treatment and a Contribution Choice treatment. In this work we distinguish between conditional
cooperators and exploiters, which adapt differently to the game given the probability to adjust
and the framing through which they adjust the independent contribution. When the probability
of adjusting get larger, participants are more willing to behave as conditional cooperators, with
independent contribution increasing through time.
Chapter 5 looks at individual decisions and experience effect in gambling games. We focus
on a well-known cognitive bias, the almost-winning bias; agents misrepresenting the game are
unable to distinguish between situations in which near misses signal ability and those in which
no ability is involved. The experiment is aimed at checking players behavior given different set
of information and two framings. Participant tend to change their individual behavior through
time to a safer approach; they decrease their bets across rounds, although the almost-winning
bias still resist for some agents. After playing several rounds, two different information settings
were implemented in order to understand how to decrease the number of erroneous perceptions
by warning subjects on almost-winning bias and independence of events or by disclosing the
actual winning probabilities (nudging versus awareness). Both nudging and awareness are
effective in reducing the willingness to choose the risky option but only the latter helps people
to correctly interpret the game and the AW bias tends to disappear.
2
Chapter 2
Make-Up and Suspicion in bargaining
with cheap talk. An experiment
controlling for gender and gender
constellation
with D. Di Cagno, W. Güth, N. Pace, L. Panaccione (Theory and Decision, 1-9, 2015)
Abstract
This paper explores gender differences in "make- up" and "suspicion" in a bargaining game
in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed
potential buyer who then proposes a price for the company. "Make-up" is measured by how
much the true value is overstated, "suspicion" by how much the price offer differs from the
value message. We run different computerized treatments varying in information about the
gender (constellation) and in embeddedness of gender information. The asymmetry of the
game and of information allows for a robust assessment of gender (constellation) effects. We
report here the results from just one shot round decision since we expect such effects to be more
pronounced for inexperienced participants. We mainly find an effect of gender constellation:
when female sellers are aware to confront a female buyer, they overstate more, i.e. there is
more "make-up". However, we cannot confirm gender (constellation) effects for suspicion.
Keywords: bargaining, cheap-talk, experiment, gender.
JEL: C78; C91; J16
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2.1. Introduction
Much of gender research in experimental economics focus on differences in risk, delay, inequity,
... aversion to explain differences in subjects’ choices. In this study, we are interested in the
rather different hypothesis that, due to gender specific characteristics in bargaining, women are
more suspicious than men and feel less obliged to tell the truth. This hypothesis is based on
the evidence that persons belonging to groups that historically have been discriminated against
(e.g., minorities and women) are less likely to trust and therefore behaving more strategically
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Therefore, women could have evolved as relatively more risk
averse (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), but also superior in detecting others’ trustworthiness and
in strategizing (Buss, 2005). So far the evidence for such hypotheses is inconclusive (Eagly
and Wood, 1999).
We aim at verifying that women are more suspicious and strategizing than men by using a
modified "Acquiring-a-Company" game (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985), in which the seller
of the company, after learning its value, can strategize when sending a value message to the
potential buyer. The buyer then proposes a price after having received the message without,
but knowing the value of the firm.1 Since the message can be truthful or not, the price offer
will reflect not only the desired share of surplus from trade but also the buyer’s suspicion: for a
more suspicious buyer the difference of the message received and the price proposed should be
larger.
Since the experimental setting is one of bargaining whether to trade and, if so, at which
price, our study is in line with those on gender differences in bargaining (Ayres and Siegelman
1995; Eckel and Grossman, 2001; Saad and Tripatl, 2001; Solnick, 2001; Riley and McGinn
2002; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Sutter et al. 2009; García-
Gallego 2012). We add new insights to this strand of gender research since we study how
"make up", i.e. seller’s overstatement of the firm’s true value and "suspicion", i.e. buyer’s
underpricing of the value message, depend on gender and gender constellation. Furthermore,
we study how seller’s acceptance of price offers depends on gender and gender constellation.2
We expected women to "make-up" (strategize) more, to be more "suspicious" (underprice
more), and to accept to trade more frequently when bargaining with female rather than with
male partners.
Our results are based on the first paid round of an experiment which includes subsequent
repeated rounds. We concentrate here on this set of data since we expect gender differences
1The “Acquiring-a-Company” game is often used as a simple environment to analyze the “winner’s curse”
(Kagel 1995, Thaler 1988). In a companion paper, we provide an analysis of this effect by using the data from
repeated rounds (see Di Cagno et al. 2015).
2This step of the decision process resembles an ultimatum game. Therefore, our findings can be compared to
the results of gender differences in that framework.
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to emerge more clearly from choice behavior of inexperienced participants, for whom the
offsetting effect of experience and learning are absent.
We find a significant effect of the female-female constellation for making up, i.e. sending
value messages which overstate the true value of the firm. On the contrary, the experimental
hypothesis that women are more suspicious than men is not confirmed by our analysis. However,
the latter finding has to be interpreted with care since suspicion, measured as underpricing the
value message, confounds the limited trust of that message with asking for a higher share from
the surplus of trade.
2.2. The Game and the Experiment Setup
We consider a modified "Acquiring-a-Company" game in which the seller, after learning the
firm’s value v, can send a value message vˆ = vˆ(v) to the potential buyer (Güth et al., 2014).
The value of the firm is known only to the seller and is randomly generated according to
the uniform density, concentrated on the interval (0,1). The seller’s evaluation of the firm
is qv with 0 < q < 1. The parameter q is exogenously given and commonly known. After
receiving the value message v̂, the buyer proposes a price p = p(vˆ) for acquiring the company.
If trade occurs, the gains from trade are v− p for buyer and p−qv for seller, hence the surplus
amounts to (1−q)v, which is always positive. The seller can accept or reject the offer, after
which the game ends. The payoff is δ (p−qv) for the seller and δ (v− p) for the buyer, where
δ = δ (p, v̂,v) = 1 if the offer is accepted and δ = δ (p, v̂,v) = 0 if it is rejected. According to
the benchmark solution, under the assumption of risk neutrality, the buyer offers p∗ = 0 when
q > 12 , which the seller rejects, and p
∗ = q when q≤ 12 , which the seller accepts.
We run an experiment aimed at analyzing subjects’ acceptance decisions, "make-up" −
measured by the difference between the value message vˆ and the true value v − and "suspicion"
− measured by the difference between the value message vˆ and the price offer p − by
controlling not only for gender but also for gender constellation. To this aim, we ran twelve
gender-balanced sessions at the laboratory of Max Planck Institute in Jena. A total of 376
students of different disciplines (11 sessions of 32 participants plus 1 session of 24) were
recruited among the undergraduate population of Jena University using Orsee (Greiner, 2004).
The experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).3
At the beginning of the experiment, half of participants were assigned to the role of seller
and half to the role of buyer. In each session, male and female participants were evenly split in
the two roles.
3After reading the instructions (see Appendix A) participants had to answer a few control questions before the
experiment started.
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The basic decisions were taken in the following order. First, the computer selects for
each seller the value of the firm v according to a discrete uniform distribution on (0,100) and
communicates it only to each seller. Second, the computer selects the value of q from a discrete
uniform distribution concentrated on (0,1) and communicates it to both sellers and buyers.
Third, the seller decides the value message v̂ to send to the buyer. Fourth, after receiving the
value message, the buyer decides the price offer and communicate it to the seller. Finally, the
seller decides whether to accept it or not. If she accepts, the firm will be sold at the offered
price, while, if she does not, no trade takes place. At the end of the round, the payoffs of buyers
and sellers are calculated by the computer and individually communicated.
We framed this decision process in three treatments differing in information only: in
treatment U (Unknown), trading partners, randomly matched in pairs, are unaware of other’s
gender, which is known in treatment G (awareness of gender constellations). Finally, in
treatment E (embedded information about the gender constellation) the field of study of both
partners is added to information on gender in order to control for demand effects.
2.3. Main Findings
Proceeding as in backward induction, we begin with analyzing acceptance decisions δ by seller
participants as depending on the profitability of the price offer.4
Observation 1. One mainly observes the predicted theoretical rational behavior: δ = 1 for
p ≥ qv and δ = 0 for p < qv. There exist no gender (constellation) effect in acceptance
behavior of seller participants (see Table 2.1).
These findings suggest that acceptance decision does not depend on the share of surplus
that the seller aims to gain and question other-regarding concerns: at least for situations when
own generosity would let the other gain whereas oneself suffers a (minor) loss, there is no
evidence of pro-social behavior according to acceptance data (only 1.8% of sellers accepted to
trade when p < qv). The seller accepts whenever he or she finds it convenient and his or her
decision is not affected by a strategic behavior related to the price offer.
As far as "suspicion" is concerned, the price offer by the buyer could be influenced not only
by suspiciousness about the value message but also by the desire to obtain a higher share of
the surplus from trade. Thus a buyer who thinks the value message is truthful, i.e. expects
vˆ(v) = v, may well propose a price p < vˆ. Actually, for ultimatum experiments, Eckel and
4What this neglets is a direct effect of the parameter q and the value v, which together determine the surplus
from trade, as well as of v̂. We also checked the direct effect of q and v and the results do not change.
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Table 2.1: Seller’s acceptance δ by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 0.06
(0.05)
Treatment G -0.01 -0.08 -0.08
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
Treatment E 0.07
(0.06)
male seller-female buyer -0.05 -0.02 -0.13 -0.05 -0.02 -0.00
(0.09) (0.08) (0.20) (0.24) (0.10) (0.08)
female seller-male buyer -0.06 -0.03 0.15 0.23 -0.14 -0.11
(0.09) (0.09) (0.14) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10)
female seller-female buyer -0.03 -0.08 -0.02
(0.09) (0.22) (0.10)
male seller-male buyer 0.03 0.08 0.02
(0.09) (0.22) (0.10)
profitability (p≥ qv) 0.71*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.81*** 0.81*** 0.71*** 0.71***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08)
Constant 0.07 0.20** 0.16** 0.02 -0.06 0.22** 0.19**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.08) (0.11) (0.20) (0.11) (0.09)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R squared 0.43 0.46 0.35 0.46 0.46 0.49 0.49
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01
Grossman (2001) find that women as proposer are more generous than men, that, in our set up,
corresponds to offering a higher price. Thus more suspiciousness by female buyers could be
compensated by more generous price offers. We do not claim to distinguish pure suspicion and
underpricing to guarantee a satisfactory own share of the surplus but only maintain that more
"suspicion" should increase vˆ− p.
Observation 2. Male and female buyers do not differ in "suspicion", i.e. we cannot reject that
vˆ− p is homogeneously distributed for male and female buyer participants.
Note, however, the significantly lower prices offered to male sellers in Treatment G (see
Table 2.2).5 This evidence could be explained by expecting that male sellers overstate more, con-
trary to our "make-up" hypothesis, or by discrimination of male sellers. Actually, Observation
3 below suggests no difference in overstating which supports the latter explanation.
Observation 2 as such does not question the hypothesis that women have evolved as more
skeptical. The fact that we do not observe significant gender (constellation) differences in our
measure of suspiciousness may be due to male buyers asking for a higher own share of the
surplus from trade. This would suggest that male sellers reveal more ambition also by more
make up so that the difference vˆ− v is larger for them than for female sellers. This, however,
can be rejected, as the following observation makes clear.
5This result is quite in contrast to the finding of Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) in a field experiment.
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Table 2.2: Buyer’s offered price p by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 0.73 3.70 6.65 3.89
(7.18) (8.35) (22.38) (9.24)
Male× vˆ -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.05
(0.14) (0.16) (0.40) (0.18)
Partner: Male -4.28 -28.97* 2.49
(8.59) (15.64) (9.54)
Partner Male × vˆ 0.08 0.49* -0.03
(0.16) (0.26) (0.18)
Treatment G 2.39 2.14 2.51
(3.28) (3.05) (2.91)
Treatemtn E 0.06
(2.49)
q 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.22** 0.21** 0.17*** 0.17**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
vˆ 0.49*** 0.47*** 0.41*** 0.57** 0.30 0.45*** 0.45***
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.27) (0.21) (0.11) (0.12)
Constant -0.53 -1.65 2.39 -8.08 11.03 -0.35 0.28
(4.91) (5.65) (4.55) (19.50) (12.51) (6.00) (4.93)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.327 0.362 0.362 0.411 0.474 0.344 0.342
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01
Observation 3. Male and female sellers do not differ in "make up", i.e. we cannot reject that
vˆ− v is homogeneously distributed for male and female seller participants (see Table 2.3).
Even though there is no gender effect on making up, we find a gender constellation
effect since, as stated by Observation 4, female sellers trading with female buyers "make-up"
significantly more.
Observation 4. In treatment G, there is more "make-up" in the female-female constellation,
i.e. there is evidence that women are more strategizing by overstating more, quite surprisingly,
confronting a female buyer (see Table 2.4).
To further investigate the making up attitude, we report in Table 2.5 the probabilities of
stating a value message equal, greater or lower than the true value of the firm for the pooled
data from treatments G and E, which provide common knowledge of gender constellation.
There is quite some heterogeneity in value messages sent by sellers: 52.13% of them
overstate (vˆ(v) > v), 26.60% understate (vˆ(v) < v), and 21.28% are truthful (vˆ(v) = v). Fur-
thermore, consistently with Observation 4, we find a significant gender constellation effect on
the probability of overstating (P = 0.046). Therefore, we conclude that average overstating
and its probability are larger for the female-female constellation.
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Table 2.3: Seller’s “make-up” (vˆ− v) by treatment and gender
Treatments All G & E G E
Male 1.49 1.53 -4.25 3.46
(2.70) (3.43) (6.85) (3.97)
Partner: Male -2.50 -17.63*** 2.54
(3.43) (6.09) (3.97)
Treatment G -1.54 0.81 0.81
(3.99) (3.93) (3.84)
Treatment E -2.35
(2.90)
Constant 5.86** 3.48 5.50** 7.19 13.88*** 2.52 2.98
(2.38) (2.53) (2.74) (5.32) (4.00) (2.68) (2.94)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.005 0.002 0.005 0.013 0.218 0.008 0.004
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01
Table 2.4: Seller’s “make-up” (vˆ− v) by treatment and gender constellation
Treatments All G & E G E
Treatment G -1.54 0.81 0.81
(3.89) (3.83) (3.83)
Treatment E -2.35
(2.90)
male seller-female buyer -2.62 -2.88 -3.84 10.88 -11.00 -7.46 -1.46
(3.94) (4.91) (4.97) (8.43) (7.73) (5.81) (5.94)
female seller-male buyer -6.36* -6.91 -7.88* -2.50 -24.38** -8.38 -2.38
(3.68) (4.69) (4.75) (9.50) (8.89) (5.26) (5.41)
female seller-female buyer 0.77 0.97 21.88** -6.00
(3.85) (4.93) (7.99) (5.71)
male seller-male buyer -0.97 -21.87** 6.00
(4.93) (7.99) (5.71)
Constant 8.65*** 6.45* 7.42** -2.50 19.38*** 9.71** 3.71
(3.24) (3.58) (3.71) (6.12) (5.13) (3.93) (4.14)
Observations 188 128 128 32 32 96 96
R-squared 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.263 0.263 0.029 0.029
Notes: OLS regressions. Coefficients and Huber-White robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported. Significance: * 0.1, ** 0.05, ***
0.01
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Table 2.5: Truthtelling, overstating and understating the value message by gender and gender
constellation
female seller male seller P-value
Truthtelling 24.47 18.09 0.288
female buyer 21.88 15.63
male buyer 31.25 21.88
P-value 0.404 0.529
Overstating 50.00 54.26 0.562
female buyer 59.38 46.88
male buyer 34.38 59.38
P-value 0.046 0.324
Understating 25.53 27.66 0.743
female buyer 18.75 37.50
male buyer 34.38 18.75
P-value 0.162 0.098
Notes: This table considers data from Treatment G and Treatment E.
2.4. Conclusions
By a modification of the "Acquiring-a-Company" game, we studied in the lab how "make-up",
"suspicion" and acceptance in bargaining depend on gender and gender constellation.
We find that female sellers make up significantly more and more frequently when matched
with the same gender.
There is a surprising degree of truth-telling and an even higher degree of understating which,
however, do not differ across gender and gender constellations. Moreover, we find no gender
nor gender constellation effect on acceptance and no evidence of pro-social behavior, not even
in those situations when generosity would let the other gain a lot at minor own loss. However,
we can confirm that women are more strategizing by overstating more and more likely when
confronting a female buyer.
Finally, at first sight it may seem that not being able to confirm that women are more
suspicious is not consistent with the literature which finds significant, though conflicting,
gender effects. Eckel and Grossman (2001) show that women are more generous as proposers
in ultimatum experiments while Garcia-Gallego et al. (2012) argue that they are less generous,
and also question the relevance of risk attitude.6
However, in our setting with asymmetric information and stochastic uncertainty "take-it-or-
leave-it" price offers may not be gender (constellation) biased since trusting the value of the
message is confounded with asking a higher share of surplus. Decoupling these two effects
has been analyzed by assuming that more or less ambition in demanding a larger surplus share
from trade should go along with more or less ambition in overstating. Since the latter is not
6According to our data, risk attitude does not affect the results.
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significantly affected by gender (constellation) we could not confirm that women are more
suspicious although we partly found them to be more often and to a larger extent strategizing.
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Introduction 
Welcome to our experiment! 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions and so will the other 
participants. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of the other 
participants will determine your earnings according to some rules, which will be shortly explained 
later. In addition to your earnings from your decisions over the course of the experiment, you will 
receive a participation fee of 10 euro. Besides this amount, you can earn more euro. However, there 
is also a possibility of losing part of the participation fee, as it will be explained in the next section 
of these instructions. But do not worry: you will never be asked to pay with your own money, as 
your losses during the tasks will be covered by the participation fee. The participation fee and any 
additional amount of money you will earn during the experiment will be paid individually 
immediately at the end of the experiment; no other participant will know how much you earned. All 
monetary amounts in the experiment will be computed in ECU (Experimental Currency Units). At 
the end of the experiment, all earned in ECUs will be converted into euro using the following 
exchange rate: 
30 ECU= 1 euro 
You will be making your decisions by clicking on appropriate buttons on the screen. All the 
participants are reading the same instructions and taking part in this experiment for the first time, as 
you are. 
Please note that hereafter any form of communication between the participants is strictly prohibited. 
If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the experiment with no payment. If you have any 
questions, please raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and answer your questions 
individually.  
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Description of the Experiment 
This experiment is fully computerized. This experiment consists of the following four phases, each 
composed by a different number of rounds: Phase I of 1 round, Phase II of 30 rounds, Phase III 
of 12 rounds, and Phase IV of  10 rounds. After completing Phase I, you will proceed to Phase II; 
after completing Phase II, you will proceed to Phase III; after completing Phase III you will proceed 
to Phase IV. You can earn money in each phase of the experiment. 
At the beginning and at the end of the Experiment, you are asked to reply to a short questionnaire. 
At the beginning of the Experiment, each participant is randomly assigned one of two possible 
roles. Half the participants will be assigned the role of Buyer; the other half will be assigned the 
role of Seller. You will remain in the same role you have been assigned throughout the experiment.  
In each of Phase I, II and III and in each of their rounds you will be matched with a different 
participant randomly assigned to you. In Phase IV you will decide individually and independently 
of your role. 
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Description of the Task – Phase I 
In Phase I selling of a firm between a Seller, who owns the firm, and Buyer can take place. You will 
be told if you are Buyer or Seller, and will be matched with one of the other participant in the other 
role. For example, if you are selected as Buyer, then you will be randomly and anonymously 
matched with another participant who is a Seller. 
The computer will randomly select the value of the firm among the following values:  5, 10, 15, 20, 
25, 30, 35, 40, 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, 80, 85, 90 and 95 (all the values are equally likely). This 
value will be communicated only to the Seller. The Buyer will not learn the value of the firm 
selected randomly by the computer. 
The Seller’s evaluation of the firm is proportional to the value of the firm selected by the computer. 
This proportion will be randomly selected by the computer and can only take one of the following 
values: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80 or 90 percent (all the values are equally likely). The Seller’s 
evaluation is the value of the firm multiplied by the selected proportion. The proportion will be 
communicated to both, Buyer and Seller, whereas the value of the firm will be known only to the 
Seller. Do not worry: the software will provide the information on the decision screen, depending 
on your role, Seller or Buyer.  
As an example, suppose that the computer selected a value of the firm equal to 90 and a proportion 
of 50 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm will be 45, corresponding to 50 percent of 
90. In this case, the Seller will find on the screen of the computer that the value of the firm is 90, the 
proportion is 50 percent and that the Seller’s evaluation is 45; the Buyer will find on the screen 
only the proportion of 50 percent. Another example: suppose that the computer selected a value of 
the firm equal to 90 and a proportion of 80 percent. In this case, the Seller’s evaluation will be equal 
to 72, corresponding to 80 percent of 90. In this case, the Seller will find on the screen of the 
computer that the value of the firm is 90, the proportion is 80 percent and that the Seller’s 
evaluation is 72; the Buyer will find on the screen only the proportion of 80 percent. 
The Seller sends a value message to the Buyer about the value of the firm, which can be either true 
or false. Therefore, the value message is not necessarily equal to the firm value nor to the Seller’s 
evaluation of the firm. The message consists of an integer value between 0 and 100. 
After having received the message, the Buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the Seller by 
proposing a price, an integer number between 0 and 100. When making this offer, the Buyer just 
knows the value message and by which proportion of the value the Seller evaluates the firm.  
After having received the price offer of the Buyer, the Seller decides whether to accept it or not. If 
she accepts, the firm will be sold for the offered price to the Buyer. If she does not accept, no trade 
takes place. After the Seller has decided, the payoffs of Buyer and of Seller are calculated and 
individually communicated at the end of Phase I. These payoffs are calculated as explained below 
and they are paid to all participants at the end of the experiment. 
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Calculation of the payoff in Phase I 
The payoff of the unique round in Phase I does not depend on the value message and is calculated 
as follows: 
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the payoffs are:  
 The Buyer earns the difference between the value of the firm and the accepted price 
 The Seller earns the difference between the accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the 
firm 
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is 
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offer a price equal to 
40, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 40 = 5, and the Seller earns 40 – 
36 = 4.  
Another example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm 
value is 80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price 
equal to 55, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 55 = - 10, and the Seller 
earns 55 – 36 = 19. 
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer.  
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Description of the Task – Phase II 
In Phase II, you will face for 30 rounds the same situation as in Phase I. As in the previous Phase, in 
each of the rounds you will be matched with a different participant randomly assigned to you. 
The same instructions as in Phase I apply to Phase II, also the calculation of the payoffs. 
The payment from this Phase will consist of the payoff of one of the 30 rounds randomly 
selected. For example, if round number five is selected, your payment for Phase II will be the 
payoff you earned in that round. 
 
Calculation of the payoff in each round in Phase II 
The payoff of each round in Phase II does not depend on the value message and is calculated as 
follows: 
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the payoffs are:  
 The Buyer earns the difference between the value of the firm and the accepted price 
 The Seller earns the difference between the accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the 
firm 
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is 
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offer a price equal to 
40, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 40 = 5, and the Seller earns 40 – 
36 = 4.  
Another example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm 
value is 80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price 
equal to 55, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 55 = - 10, and the Seller 
earns 55 – 36 = 19. 
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer. 
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Description of the Task – Phase III 
In Phase III, you will face for 12 rounds the same situation as in Phase I. As in the previous Phase, 
in each of the rounds you will be matched with a different participant randomly assigned to you. 
The same instructions as in Phase I apply to Phase III. 
At the beginning of the Phase you will be asked if you prefer to be paid on the basis of the payoff of 
one of the 12 rounds randomly selected or on the basis of the average payoff of the 12 rounds. 
On the basis of your choice, the computer will calculate your payoff for this Phase. 
 
Calculation of the payoff in each round in Phase III 
The payoff of each round in Phase II does not depend on the value message and is calculated as 
follows: 
If the Seller has accepted the offered price, the payoffs are:  
 The Buyer earns the difference between the value of the firm and the accepted price 
 The Seller earns the difference between the accepted price and the Seller’s evaluation of the 
firm 
An example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm value is 
80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offer a price equal to 
40, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 40 = 5, and the Seller earns 40 – 
36 = 4.  
Another example: suppose that the firm value is equal to 45 and that the proportion of the firm 
value is 80 percent, so that the Seller’s evaluation of the firm is 36. Suppose the Buyer offers a price 
equal to 55, and that the Seller accepts it. In this case, the Buyer earns 45 – 55 = - 10, and the Seller 
earns 55 – 36 = 19. 
If the Seller does not accept the Buyer’s offer, the payoffs are 0 for both Seller and Buyer. 
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Description of the Task – Phase IV 
Phase IV consists of 10 rounds; during this Phase you won’t interact with other participants. During 
this Phase you are asked to choose between pairs of lotteries. In particular, in each round for each 
lottery pair you have to assess which one you would prefer to play. 
At the end of the experiment, one round will be randomly selected for payment, and the computer 
will play on your screen the lottery that you have preferred in this round. The payment of Phase IV 
is given by the result of this lottery. 
 
Your Final Payment 
Your final payment will be displayed on the screen at the end of the experiment. It is determined as 
the sum of: 
 Payoff from the unique round in Phase I (in euro) 
 Payoff from one randomly selected round  in Phase II (in euro) 
 Payoff from EITHER one randomly selected round OR an average payment between 12 
rounds from  Phase III (in euro) 
 Payoff from one randomly selected round in Phase IV (in euro) 
 Participation fee.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3
To Switch or Not to Switch Payment
Scheme? Determinants and Effects in a
Bargaining Game
with N. Pace
Abstract
The incentive scheme selected in an experiment might trigger different type of behavior in
participants. This paper is an attempt to screen the strategies adopted by agents in a bargaining
game when buyer and seller have partly conflicting interests and are asymmetrically informed.
We allow participants to choose the incentive scheme through which they will be paid at the
end of the experiment controlling for past experience and individual characteristics. It is well
known that payment method is highly correlated to the risk preferences shown by individuals,
but little research is devoted to the analysis of the behavior induced by Random lottery Incentive
scheme (RLI for short) and Cumulative Scheme payment (CS for short) both on individual and
social results. This paper aims to fill the gap.
Keywords: bargaining, experiment, gender, payment scheme.
JEL: C78; C91; J16; J33
3.1. Introduction
In bargaining games strategic behavior of trading partners is essential for the final gains. What
is generally underestimated is the importance of payment schemes in shaping strategic behavior
and the heterogeneity of agents who may feel attracted by different incentive schemes that better
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suit their characteristics and preferences. Indeed, specific payment method in bargaining games
are likely to affect individual strategies, but also tend to favor those subjects who perceived a
specific incentive mechanism as more appropriate to the task and to their attitudes.
In this work we study the characteristics and strategic behaviors of experienced sellers
and buyers who trade over the selling of a firm and have the option to change their payment-
incentive scheme from a Random Lottery Incentive to a Cumulative Scheme (RLI and CS
hereafter). In particular, we investigate whether past experience and individual characteristics
affect the choice of switching payment scheme and whether this choice influences strategic
behaviors. The key point is that agents are characterized by heterogeneous preferences and
may behave differently when they have the option to sort themselves into payment incentive
mechanisms associated to different levels of riskiness that better suit their intrinsic attitudes.
So far methodological studies in the experimental context have focused on the validity of RLI
and CS as unbiased and optimizing incentive schemes. Holt (1986) shows that responses to RLI
might be biased by other tasks when subjects are not represented by expected utility preferences.
Starmer and Sugden (1991) discuss Holt’s hypothesis, rejecting his model but without ruling
out the possibility that RLI is a bias-payment scheme. Although some critiques are moved to
RLI, Cubitt et al. (1998) and Beattie and Loomes (1997) among others, restore the validity of
RLI. 1
In this sense, the number of experiments adopting RLI rather than CS incentive have
decreased in the last decades and when comparing the two payment schemes, results appear
quite mixed in the literature. Lee (2008) underlines that risk-averse subjects incentivized by CS
tend to follow decreasing absolute risk aversion and behave more risk aversely while RLI is a
method that can control for wealth effect and is considered a better incentive scheme. Laury
(2005) focuses on eliciting choices under different payment schemes, including RLI and CS,
finding out that no significant difference rises. 2
Even though subjects might be consistent across incentive schemes when their choices affect
their own payoff, things might change when they are asked to anticipate the strategy of another
agent. To the best of our knowledge, current analysis explores individual decision making under
different payment schemes in "games against nature," while changing incentives in games
where individuals should reason and learn about other’s behavior has not been explored (Beattie
and Loomes, 1997).
This paper is an attempt to screen the strategies adopted by subjects in a bargaining game
when buyer and seller have partly conflicting interests and asymmetric information. We are
1Since only one task will be paid for real, the RLI may encourage subjects to think about each task as if it
were the only task faced and have the desirable effect of eliminating wealth effects (Bardsley 2010).
2Further discussion on incentive mechanisms to adopt in experimental settings is discussed by Azrieli et al.
(2012), Cox et al. (2014), Harrison and Swarthout (2014).
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particularly interested in the role of incentives and motivations. As described by Bardsley et
al. (2009), motivation determines the behavior of subjects, although it is not controllable by
experimenters because of the difficulty of knowing, for example, whether subjects preferences
conform to the payment scheme imposed by the experimenter. This work tries to include both
elements by allowing subjects to take their own design decision in light of their individual
experience and preferences.
Previous contributions mostly focus on the effects of different incentive schemes on produc-
tivity and final payoff, without taking into account the fact that neglecting the importance of
sorting into a particular scheme may lead to an overestimation of the role of incentives (Lazear,
2000). Only few empirical studies address this issue. In a controlled laboratory environment,
Dohmen and Falk (2011) investigate which personal characteristics beyond individual produc-
tivity differences provoke workers to self-select into variables instead of fixed-pay contracts,
and how relevant characteristics such as risk aversion, relative self-assessment, social prefer-
ences, gender, or personality shape the selection process. Their results reveal the importance
of multidimensional sorting. Indeed, they find that output in the variable-payment schemes is
higher than output under fixed-wage regime and they were able to attribute output differences
to productivity sorting (more productive workers prefer the variable payment). Moreover, they
find that women are less likely to choose a variable-payment scheme than men, supporting the
idea that women tend to shy away from competition and select jobs that involve little or no
competition.
The experiment of Eriksson et al. (2009) confirms the relevance of self-selection and the risk
of overestimating variability of the effort exacerbated in experiments related to tournaments due
to the fact that a competitive payment scheme is imposed on very risk-averse or under-confident
subjects. In fact the choice on payment scheme, driven by risk preferences, reduces the variance
of effort.
This paper focuses on a laboratory experimental setting which mimics a bargaining problem,
using a modified version of Acquiring-a-Company game (Samuelson and Bazerman, 1985).
An informed seller has to sell a company to an uninformed buyer, which offers a price based on
a message (which can be true or can be false) on the value of the firm.
Experienced players, after playing 31 rounds of the bargaining problem, either assigned
to the seller role or the buyer role, are asked to choose whether to switch from a RLI scheme,
based on one random round selected at the end of the experiment, to a CS, consisting on the
average payoff gained for the following stage, lasting 12 rounds.
The final goal of the paper is to understand the redistribution of the final outcomes and
the social equality stemming from the incentive scheme chosen, and the matching between
different payment schemes. In order to reach this goal, we structured the analysis in three steps.
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First, we study the individuals’ determinants of switching into a specific payment scheme,
taking advantage of the availability of the past history of behavior and performance in the first
stage of 31 rounds, as well as background information on individual characteristics. Second,
we investigate whether the chosen payment scheme affects behavior and outcomes. Finally, we
focus on the redistributive issue. In particular we study whether, under asymmetric information
and different incentive schemes, sellers and buyers are able to share the total surplus of a single
trade, and whether social equality is favored by switching incentive scheme.
Our results point out that sellers choose the payment scheme regardless of past history
and that female sellers are more attracted by the CS scheme than male sellers, while buyers,
who are actually facing the risky choice, prefer RLI where they moderate riskiness by playing
more aggressively, but this is true only for female buyers. After choosing the payment scheme,
sellers are generally more willing to accept the deals when paid according to CS, while buyers
are more likely to earn more when choosing the RLI scheme, associated to lower price offers to
the sellers.
Players are unaware of the payment selected by their trading partner, although the seller
gets better deals when choosing CS and meeting a CS buyer; buyer improves his/her payoff by
selecting RLI and meeting with a CS seller.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the game model. Section 5.2 focuses
on the experimental approach and Section 3.4 illustrates the results. The main conclusions of
the paper are reported in Section 5.4.
3.2. Game Model
The game we adopted in this work is based on a modified version of the Acquiring-A-Company
game proposed by Samuelson and Bazerman (1985). The firm owned by the seller has value
v (known only by seller), randomly generated according to the uniform distribution (0,1).
However, for the seller the value of the firm is only qv, with 0 < q < 1. The distribution of v
and the value of q are common knowledge, while the value of the firm v is only known by seller.
If trade occurs at price p, the buyer earns v− p and the seller p−qv.3 The decision process in
each round is as follows:
(i) knowing v, the seller sends the value message vˆ = vˆ(v) which might be true (vˆ = v) or false
(vˆ ̸= v);
(ii) after receiving message vˆ, the buyer proposes the price p = p(vˆ);
3Di Cagno et al. (2015b) is based on the same model
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(iii) after receiving the price offer, the seller accepts it (δ (p) = 1) or rejects it (δ (p) = 0).
The seller earns δ (p)(p−qv) and the buyer δ (p)(v− p): when trading, i.e., when δ (p) = 1,
the total surplus v(1−q) is always positive. When not trading, i.e., when δ (p) = 0, both buyer
and seller earn nothing.
Since δ (p) = 1 is only optimal for p≥ qv, a risk-neutral buyer expects to earn
∫ p/q
0
(v− p)dv = (0.5−q) p
2
q2
(3.1)
which increases (decreases) with p for q < 0.5 (q > 0.5). Since v < 1 implies vq < q, it is
never optimal for the buyer to offer a price higher than q: the price p = q is optimal for q≤ 0.5
whereas trade is avoided by p = 0 for q > 0.5. This benchmark solution is not questioned by
cheap talk, i.e. the value message vˆ.
Still one might want to speculate how behavior is affected when − at least some − seller
participants are feeling obliged to tell the truth. When expecting this, buyer participants may
believe the message vˆ and suggest a price between qvˆ and vˆ. Fairness-minded buyer participants
might even propose the price p(vˆ) = (1+q)vˆ2 splitting the surplus from trade (1−q)vˆ equally split
so that the Surplus Share (SS) gained by seller and buyer is SSBuyer = SSSeller =
(1−q)v
2 which
implies p−qv(1−q)v =
v−p
(1−q)v . Actually quite a number of seller participants feel obliged to choose
vˆ(v) = v, and many price offers lay between qvˆ and vˆ. However, cheap talk value messages more
frequently induce opportunistic sellers to try to exploit buyers by “making up” via vˆ(v)> v and
this, in turn, questions buyers’ trust in the message sent by the seller. We expect experienced
buyers to be more skeptical and less trusting in order to avoid losses and the winner’s curse.4.
3.3. Experimental Protocol
We refer to the last stage results of a broader experimental project as Stage 1.5 This stage
consists of playing the bargaining game for 12 rounds and has been preceded by 31 rounds of
the same game, which should allow our participants to fully understand the game (we call it
Stage 0).
We ran 12 sessions with a total of 376 students (11 sessions with 32 participants each, plus
one session with 24), recruited among the undergraduate population of Jena University using
4Winner’s curse in the modified version of Acquiring-a-company game has been discussed by Di Cagno et al.
(2015b)
5The English translation of the Instructions of the whole experiment is reported in AppendixA, where Phase
III refers to what we name here Stage 1. We refer to previous stages as Stage 0.
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Orsee (Greiner, 2004), at the laboratory of Max Planck Institute in Jena. The experiment was
fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
At the beginning of the experiment, before Stage 0, each participant is randomly assigned
to one of the two possible roles (seller or buyer) and remains in this role throughout the whole
experiment: Half of the participants are buyers, the other half sellers. Without being made
aware of this, half of the sellers and buyers were males and the other half females. In each round,
participants were randomly matched with a partner in the other role in order to possibly trade
the firm owned by the seller. The value of the firm v, randomly selected for each seller-buyer
pair according to a discrete uniform distribution concentrated on (0,100), is told only to the
seller (the actual values in the experiment, selected in steps of five, were 5, 10, ..., 95). Both
(seller and buyer) are aware of the proportion (q), correlating the true evaluations v for buyer
and qv for seller linearly. This proportion q is randomly selected from a discrete uniform
distribution (0,1); the actual values q in the experiment were rescaled in % and could only
assume the following values: 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, or 90 percent.
Table 3.1: Road map of game rounds
Step† Seller Buyer Description
0 q,v known q known Initial information
Partner information⋆ Partner information⋆ provided to buyers and sellers
1 Message vˆ X Seller sends message to Buyer
2 X Price offer p(vˆ) Buyer makes price offer
3 Acceptance δ (p) X Seller accepts or refuses price offer
4 Payoff δ (p)(p−qv) Payoff δ (p)(v− p) Seller and Buyer informed on payoff
† Each round involves four-steps.
⋆ Partner information depends on the treatment.
X Participants wait for partner’s decision, i.e. they are inactive.
In each round (see Table 3.1) bargaining proceeds in the following way: The seller sends a
value message (vˆ) to the buyer which can be true or false but not exceed 100. After receiving
the message, the buyer proposes a price p which cannot exceed 100. Having received the price
offer, the seller can accept it or not. If accepted, the firm is sold at the offered price; if not,
no trade takes place. After each round, payoffs are calculated and privately communicated to
buyer and seller.
Random matching between buyers and sellers was implemented to balance our sample by
gender constellation. Pairs occurred in equal proportion: male buyer/female seller, male
buyer/male seller, female buyer/male seller and female buyer/female seller. Participants were
reminded in each round that they have been randomly paired and they received some initial
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information on their trading partner. We ran four treatments differing in information provided
on the trading partner at the beginning of each round: In treatment U (Unknown), trading
partners randomly matched in pairs, are unaware of the other’s gender, which becomes known
in treatment G (awareness of Gender constellation). Treatment OC (Other Confound) provides
information about the field of study instead (Economics versus Non-Economics). Finally,
treatment E (Embedded Gender Constellation) provides information about other’s gender and
field of study.
3.3.1. Payment Method
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects were instructed that the payment method adopted
for the first part of the experiment was RLI scheme, in particular a round randomly selected
at the end of the whole experiment was going to be truly paid.6 At the beginning of Stage 1,
participants are asked which payment they prefer to adopt for the following 12 rounds of Stage
1, either keeping the RLI scheme or switching to an average cumulative method. Immediately
after Stage 1, in Stage 27 subjects played the Holt and Laury’s (2002) lottery protocol to elicit
risk preferences. Final gains were communicated privately at the end of the experiment, after
Stage 2.
At the end of each round, participants received feedback about their final payoff for that
round (in ECU). The conversion rate from experimental points to euro (1 euro=30 ECU) was
announced in the instructions. If the seller accepted the offered price, the buyer earned the
difference between the value of the firm and the price (v− p) and the seller the difference
between the accepted price and her evaluation of the firm (p−qv). If the price was not accepted,
the final gain from trade for both was zero due to no trade. Participants received an initial
endowment of 300 ECU (10 euro) in order to avoid bankruptcy.
3.4. Result
The result section focuses on different aspects related to the bargaining problem: We consider
both decision variables related to strategies adopted by buyers and sellers and their final
outcomes. The decision variables we consider are:
• Seller’s cheating propensity: the share vˆ−vvˆ for vˆ > 0, the relative difference between the
value stated and the true one;
6Stage 0 collects both Phase I and Phase II in the instructions, where Phase I lasted 1 incentivized round and
the 30 rounds of Phase II were paid according to RLI payment method.
7Reported in AppendixA as Phase IV of instructions.
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• Buyer’s rentability: the share vˆ−pvˆ , a measure of the gains sought by buyers given the
message received and their trust on it. 8
Both measures indicate the aggressiveness of seller and buyer in dealing with the trading partner.
Then we consider the outcome of the trading process:
• Seller’s surplus share ( p−qv(1−q)v) and buyer’s surplus share (
(v−p)
(1−q)v) when the deal is ac-
cepted.
• number of times the deal was refused; this variable is considered as an outcome from
buyer’s point of view and a decision variable when we consider the seller role.
The advantage of our experiment is the opportunity to study when/which subjects switch the
payment mode, and whether they act more cautiously in one trading role compared to the
other. This decision might be affected by inertia and wealth effect. In this sense, we design
the experiment in order to account for switching from RLI to CS because (a.) subjects are not
affected by wealth effect in the phase before switching payment and (b.) RLI is perceived as
riskier compared to CS. We control whether switching is driven by individual characteristics
such as gender and risk preferences.
We base the result analysis on (i) individual determinants and experience, the latter focusing
on the last 10 rounds of Stage 0, which is the last phase of previous Stage where subjects have
played enough rounds to become experienced players (Section 3.4.1). The following step (ii) is
to evaluate how the payment selection changes the bargaining results from the seller and buyer
point of view, in particular whether one group will end up better off than the other in terms of
total surplus share gained in each period (Section 3.4.2). Finally, (iii) it is analyzed whether
subjects are better off keeping or changing the payment scheme (Section 3.4.3). The final
analysis is aimed to analyze whether switching improves the result for both trading partners or
minimizes losses in the game (Section 3.4.4).
3.4.1. Why Do Players Switch?
At the beginning of Stage 1, the majority of sellers (81%) and buyers (73%) decide to be paid
through the average payment scheme. When we look at the gender composition, we find a
significant difference between female and male sellers i.e., female sellers choose (significantly)
more than males the cumulative payment (see Table 3.2). This gender difference does not hold
for buyers: Males choose the random payment around 25% more of the time than females do.
8Given the exogenous firm values v and q selected at each round, rentability and cheating are considered as
percentages on the value stated by sellers
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Table 3.2: Random payment choice in stage 1 by gender and role
Test on average selection of the random payment (RLI):
Female Male Female and Male P value (F-M)
Sellers 0.117 0.255 0.186 0.015
(94) (94) (188)
Buyers 0.245 0.277 0.261 0.620
(94) (94) (188)
Sellers and Buyers 0.181 0.266 0.223 0.048
(188) (188) (376)
P value (S-B) 0.02 0.74 0.08
Notes: Percentage of subjects choosing random lottery incentive scheme in stage 1 and test on payment scheme choice by gender and role.
Number of observations in parenthesis.
Apparently, the group of female sellers chooses with higher frequency the cumulative
payment when it is playing in the role that does not involve any risk.9
Past history plays a role in payment selection, as does role and gender. Figure 3.1 compares
past choices (last ten rounds from Stage 0) with the payment scheme selected at the beginning
of Stage 1 in order to control whether past decisions and outcomes drive sorting into payment
scheme. Figure 3.1 considers both seller’s decision and outcome on the left side and buyer’s
rentability and surplus share on the right side.
When we look at sellers, cheating propensity and final surplus share are not distributed differ-
ently if we control for those selecting CS rather RLI scheme. The cumulate distribution is alike
for both groups with non-parametric test confirming the graphical intuition. Buyers seeking
for higher rentability are more likely to select the RLI scheme in Stage 1 (p-value < 0.01), but
when we decompose the effect across gender, the result is significant only for female buyers
(p-value < 0.003).
Table 3.3 collects the regression analysis where we account for gender, role, and past
experience (referring to both decisions and outcomes). In particular, from model (1) to (3), we
focus on seller’s likelihood to keep RLI payment by past cheating, by past surplus share of
accepted deals (in both cases including average, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum),
and by past acceptance rate (we consider the last 10 rounds of Stage 0). Female sellers are
more likely to switch for the cumulative payment regardless of past decisions and outcomes.
Risk preferences (weakly but) significantly affect the choice made by sellers; those showing
risk-loving attitudes are more willing to keep the RLI scheme.
On the right side of Table 3.3, from model (4) to (6), we analyze the RLI scheme as a
function of buyer’s rentability, surplus share of accepted deals and acceptance rate in the last
10 rounds of Stage 0. Those offering lower prices (seeking higher rentability and trusting
less) are more willing to maintain the RLI scheme until the end of the experiment: These
buyers are characterized by more aggressiveness and are rejected more often (acceptance rate
9We test risk preferences distribution among roles and gender, without finding any relevant difference.
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Figure 3.1: Past decisions and outcomes by payment scheme
Notes: We consider decisions and outcomes from the last 10 rounds of Stage 0, splitting the subjects by the payment decision made at the
beginning of Stage 1
is significantly and negatively related to RLI scheme), and make higher profit when trades
are accepted. The payment selections for buyers are greatly influenced by past choices and
outcomes. Apparently their choices do not involve risk preferences.
Result 1. While buyers are affected by past experience (rentability, acceptance and surplus
share), the choices made by sellers are mainly related to individual characteristics. Risk
preferences play no role for buyers while sellers are partially driven by them.
3.4.2. Payment Scheme and New Strategies
At the beginning of Stage 1, we ask subjects if they prefer to keep RLI payment or switch to
CS payment. Subjects sorting themselves in new payment scheme might also change their
behavior. This section is aimed to describe the individual strategy after selecting the payment.
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Table 3.3: Payment scheme: the role of past decisions and outcomes
Sellers Buyers
Dependent: RLI dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Male 0.57** 0.55** 0.54** -0.00 0.02 0.10
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.21) (0.21) (0.20)
Risk 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.02 -0.05 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Average Cheat (%) -0.51
(1.19)
Sd Cheat -2.04
(3.36)
Min Cheat -0.04
(1.02)
Max Cheat 1.25
(1.40)
Average Rentability (%) 3.68**
(1.48)
Sd Rentability 1.63
(5.03)
Min Rentability 0.11
(1.50)
Max Rentability -1.40
(2.31)
Average SS (%)1 0.01 0.32*
(0.12) (0.18)
Sd SS -0.17 0.14
(0.16) (0.19)
Min SS 0.28 -0.00
(0.27) (0.05)
Max SS 0.06 -0.86**
(0.05) (0.40)
Average Acceptance (%) 0.80 -1.33***
(0.64) (0.46)
Constant -1.71*** -1.58*** -1.98*** -2.19*** 0.12 -0.05
(0.53) (0.28) (0.43) (0.82) (0.36) (0.30)
Observations 188 185 188 188 174 188
Chi-squared 11.64 14.88 11.64 13.04 7.33 9.07
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.04
Notes: Probit estimation and standard errors in parenthesis. All the decisions are based on individual average decision of the final 10 rounds
of Stage 0. Risk measure goes from 0 (maximum risk averse) to 9 (maximum risk seeking).
1 Surplus share (SS) include only the accepted deals: the analysis is consistent when we analyze the surplus share including not accepted
contracts. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
We compare cumulative distribution of seller’s cheating and surplus share of subjects
switching to CS and those keeping the RLI scheme in Stage 1 (left side of Figure 3.2) and
buyer’s rentability and surplus share (right side of Figure 3.2). Results are now different from
what we concluded looking at Figure 3.1: Seller’s cheating distribution (graph top-left of Figure
3.2) does not differ across payment schemes, (non parametric test confirms this) but the rate
of participants stating the true value of v is significantly higher among those keeping the RLI
payment (see Appendix B Table B.1). Additionally, when we consider the seller’s outcome, we
find that sellers are making better deals when selecting the cumulative scheme although the
non-parametric test does not reveal a significant difference.
Buyer’s rentability after payment selection is consistent with the analysis of the last 10
rounds of Stage 0: Buyers who are more skeptical and seeking a larger surplus share are trying
to offset the risk of having losses, and they are willing to select the RLI scheme because they
use a game strategy based on a very low level of trust toward sellers. As we discussed in
Section 3.4.1, the effect is mainly driven by female buyers.
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Figure 3.2: Decision and outcomes in Stage 1 by payment scheme selection in Stage 1
Notes: We consider the average decision by subjects in the 12 rounds of Stage 1.
Even looking at the surplus share distribution after the payment selection we notice a similar
path for the last 10 rounds of Stage 0. Buyer’s surplus share improves when subjects sort
themselves in the RLI. In fact, the probability of incurring losses strongly decreases (p-value
<0.003).
This result resembles the conclusions from Stage 0, although the sorting effect amplifies it
in Stage 1: While males are choosing the payment scheme regardless of their role and decisions,
female participants sort themselves to the cumulative scheme when they are in the role of seller
in order to avoid the payment mechanism perceived as riskier. Figure 3.2 justifies this choice
because cumulative scheme seems more rewarding than the RLI scheme.
When we consider buyers, female subjects select RLI scheme as much as males even though
the female subjects choosing it are also moderating the riskiness of the game by playing with a
lower degree of trust toward seller, and offering lower prices.
The analysis in Table 3.4 focuses on three types of dependent variables representing results
of Stage 1, in particular the acceptance rate, the surplus share gained (average and standard
deviation) when deals are accepted. The model we implement is:
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yi = α + β1Male×CSi + β2Male× RLIi + β3Female× RLIi + γXi + δRiski + εi (3.2)
Where we account for the interaction between payment and gender (the benchmark is the
fourth category Female×CS), Xi which is the average cheating (rentability) for seller (buyer)
and risk measure. In the left columns of Table 3.4, we consider as dependent variables Seller’s
acceptance (model 1), average surplus share (model 2) and surplus share standard deviation
(model 3). The analysis that underlines the acceptance rate is related to gender and payment
scheme selected, in particular female sellers choosing CS are more likely to accept the price
offered by buyers than female sellers choosing RLI, but the result can be extended also when
we compare female sellers with CS incentive to the male sample (although the result is not
significant). Surplus share is statistically higher (p-value<0.1) for women choosing CS but this
is significant only when we compare with males selecting RLI. This implies that women are
able to close more deals when sorting themselves in CS and also make the best of it. This result
is confirmed by the robustness check in the last 10 rounds of Stage 0 (Appendix B, Table B.2):
No interaction between contract scheme and gender is significant before choosing the payment
contract. Females switching to CS in Stage 1 are able to perform on average better than other
subjects, seeking a higher surplus share (on average) and closing more deals than the other
groups.
In the right columns of Table 3.4, we focus on the likelihood that the buyer’s offer will be
accepted (model 4), with average surplus share (model 5) and surplus share standard deviation
(model 6). Buyers are earning significantly more when sorting themselves in the RLI scheme,
although there is no statistical difference in the coefficient "RLI*Female" and "RLI*Male"
where we account for the gender effect. More aggressive buyers, seeking for larger shares of
gains, are generally accepted less frequently but this effect seems stronger for male buyers
rather than female ones. Standard deviation of surplus share through the 12 rounds of Stage 1
is significantly lower, both for sellers and buyers, when RLI payment is selected.
Result 2. Female sellers choosing CS are more likely to accept the price offered by buyers and
to get larger surplus share (significant only when comparing with males choosing RLI). Female
buyers select RLI scheme as much as males but their strategy aims to moderate the risk, by
playing with lower degree of trust toward seller and offering for lower prices.
3.4.3. Matching Contracts
The total surplus in each deal is exogenously defined by the problem variables (q and v);
players cannot change the available social surplus from trade. We investigate how payment
scheme affects redistribution between agents and whether switching (or not) favors some agents.
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Table 3.4: The role of payment scheme sorting on acceptance rate and surplus share in Stage 1
Seller Buyer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acceptance SS accept1 SS accept1 Acceptance SS accept1 SS accept1
(Mean) (Mean) (SD) (Mean) (Mean) (SD)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Cumulative Scheme*Male -0.02 -0.53 -1.14 -0.05* 0.48 -0.88
(0.03) (0.46) (0.91) (0.03) (0.48) (1.00)
RLI*Male -0.05 -0.98* -1.82* -0.06* 1.06** -2.32**
(0.04) (0.52) (0.99) (0.04) (0.52) (0.96)
RLI*Female -0.10* -0.70 -1.94** -0.03 1.08** -2.00*
(0.06) (0.53) (0.89) (0.04) (0.50) (1.06)
Cumulative Scheme*Female Benchmark
Average Cheating (%) 0.04* 0.16 0.24
(0.02) (0.17) (0.29)
Average Rentability (%) -0.66*** 1.79 -3.24
(0.19) (1.78) (3.90)
Risk 0.01** 0.01 0.00 0.01* -0.03 0.10
(0.01) (0.09) (0.18) (0.01) (0.08) (0.15)
Constant 0.51*** 2.85*** 4.74*** 0.94*** -3.05*** 6.65***
(0.03) (0.57) (1.17) (0.13) (1.09) (2.33)
Observations 188 187 185 188 184 183
R2 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.32 0.04 0.04
Notes: Dependent and independent variables are based on individual average and standard deviation of the 12 rounds of Stage 1. Risk
measure goes from 0 (maximum risk averse) to 9 (maximum risk seeking). Seller’s cheat (%) is measured as difference vˆ−vvˆ . Buyer’s
rentability (%) measures the distance between price offer and message received vˆ−pvˆ .
1 Surplus share (SS) include only the accepted deals: the analysis is consistent when we analyze the surplus share including not accepted
contracts. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Thanks to previous results, we concluded that switching the payment scheme is a signal of
individual preferences for men and it is more related to strategizing for women. In this sense,
we now discuss which payment scheme allows participants to pursue higher profits and via
which one they better perform.
In the bimatrices of Figure 3.3 we compare the aggressiveness for sellers and buyers
(cheating and rentability), acceptance and surplus share. Each matrix represents results for
seller and buyer, in particular, we set the trade between buyer and seller choosing CS as the
reference point. The other cells represent the other possible matches, and we check if these are
significantly different from the reference group for sellers (first number in bracket) and buyers
(second number).
The design excludes to be informed on the payment selected by the trade partner, although
the results are significantly changing given the matching partner and the contract he or she has
chosen.
Cheating and rentability are measures indicating the aggressiveness of players in getting
larger profits: Buyer rentability (right entry in the upper left bimatrix) is significantly higher
when buyers are sorting themselves in RLI scheme in Stage 1 (as well as late phase of Stage 0
see Appendix B, Figure B.1). The result is consistent to previous observations where buyers
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Figure 3.3: Incentive scheme matching between seller and buyer on acceptance rate and surplus
share
Notes: Coefficients from panel regressions (probit for acceptance dummy and xtreg for the other variables). We consider here the 12 rounds
of Stage 1. All results are considered as difference with seller (left entry) and buyer (right entry) choosing CS.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
tend to sort themselves to RLI contract when more aggressive. When we control seller’s
cheating, left entry in the upper left bimatrix of Figure 3.3, no difference can be observed across
groups.
Acceptance rate, in the upper right bimatrix, is significantly higher when seller and buyer
choose to switch to CS contract, while the likelihood is lowest when both select the RLI scheme.
When we double check for the last 10 rounds of Stage 0 (see Appendix B, Figure B.1), we
confirm some sort of self-selection; sellers with RLI scheme meeting with future CS buyers in
Stage 0 are trade partners with the highest probability to close the deal.
Looking at outcomes, we conclude that surplus share including only accepted deals (see lower
left bimatrix in Figure 3.3) is significantly better (worse) for buyers (sellers) when choosing the
RLI (CS). Buyer significantly improves his situation when meeting a CS seller, while seller is
significantly worse off when meeting buyer with RLI scheme. When we consider the surplus
share, including failed trades, the effect becomes even stronger (see lower right bimatrix in
Figure 3.3). The effect is negligible when we look at outcomes in Stage 0 (see Appendix B,
FigureB.1).
Result 3. Sellers choosing CS are closing more deals and making larger profits, compared to
buyers, which are better off when they keep the RLI scheme. In particular sellers matched with
RLI buyers are making significantly less profits, whereas buyers are better off when choosing
the RLI scheme, but the effect is significant only when matched with CS seller.
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3.4.4. Social (In)Equality
The Acquiring-a-Company game is a positive sum game allowing for social equality in the
form of p−qv(1−q)v =
v−p
(1−q)v . This is relevant for our study because we want to assess here whether
contracts affect the social best achieved in different trading groups, characterized by different
decisions over payment scheme.
In particular we focus on the difference between results achieved by each couple of sellers and
buyers in each round of Stage 1: |SSSeller−SSBuyer| as a measure of social inequality: It takes
value equal to zero in case of equality between partners.
Figure 3.4: Social inequality by trader’s payment method
Notes: Marginal effects from interactions between contracts choices compared with seller and buyer choosing CS.
The differences between surplus share include only the accepted deals: the analysis is consistent when we analyze the surplus share including
not accepted contracts. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Matrices in Figure 3.4 show social inequality both in last rounds of Stage 0 (on the left)
and in Stage 1(on the right). Each matrix represents the difference between surplus share, in
particular, we set the trade between buyer and seller both choosing the CS, as the reference
point. The other cells represent the other possible matches, and we check if there is any
significant difference from the reference group.
In Stage 0 we don’t find any significant difference across contracts. When we look at Stage
1, the social inequality is significantly lower when CS sellers meet RLI buyers compared to
the benchmark solution, where both seller and buyers selected CS contracts (benchmark cell is
the lower right cell of each matrix). The CS seller trading with CS buyer drives more social
inequality even when we compare with an RLI seller and buyer or an RLI seller meeting a
CS buyer, but it is not significant. This implies that the probability to close a fair contract is
higher when the seller selecting the CS scheme (associated to higher probability to accept,
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as discussed in Table 3.4) meets an RLI buyer (lower left of the right matrix in Figure 3.4),
offering lower prices and being more skeptical.
Result 4. Social (in)equality is (highest) lowest when CS sellers meet CS buyers but significantly
(higher)lower only when we compare to CS sellers meeting RLI buyers.
3.5. Final Remarks
The modified Acquiring-a-Company game admits two roles where only the uninformed side
is actually experiencing risk: Although a seller’s profit is a function of the price proposed by
buyers, she/he always has the possibility to ultimately refuse the deal. We find that buyers
selecting the RLI scheme are 25% of our sample regardless of gender. Women experiencing
risky choice through many rounds, even if losses seems likely, become more tolerant toward
risk and choose significantly more often the RLI scheme compared to female sellers. This
might have two different explanations: On the one hand, it is commonly accepted that women
shy away from competition (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007) but in our case, experienced female
buyers kept the payment scheme, perceived as riskier, because they adapted their behavior to
the game.
As Casari et al. (2007) suggest, in repeated common value auction, women experience
more often winner’s curse at first than male participants. Because of the “shock therapy” at the
beginning of the game, where they experience high losses, they adapt their strategies to avoid
future failures (women turn from more aggressive bids to bid lower) maybe because they might
have an initial lack of experience in strategic interactions compared to males (see Di Cagno et
al., 2015a for further discussion on gender differences in the early phase of our experiment).
In this sense, women improving their strategic interaction with more trials are able to select
payment design preferred, consistently with their attitude during the game more than what
males do.
On the other hand, when we consider female sellers choices, women shy away from riskier
design selecting the CS, even though the decision does not involve a true risk. This result
could be related to observations of gambling studies: Here women are more risk-averse in the
gain-domain frame, although in the loss-domain, results are not conclusive (see Harbaugh et al.
2002, Schubert et al. 1999 and Eckel and Grossman, 2008). This could explain why women
seem to be more risk-averse as sellers compared to when they are buyers.
In general, the payment scheme selected by subjects seem to favor the female attitude:
Sellers with CS incentive improve their outcomes. We cannot rule out that the improvement in
results is related to the effect of more experience, but we think that CS triggers a different be-
havior from participants which accept more often price offers and moderate the aggressiveness
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which characterize the RLI scheme. Subjects that are less aggressive sort themselves to the CS
scheme improving consistently their final result because they are more confident in this new
design.
When we look at the combination of the trade result, conclusions are indicating that the
incentive mechanism selected by subjects creates four different groups, where two of them
are characterized by aligned interests and two have different ones. The game, based on partly
conflicting interests between seller and buyer, seems to emphasize that social optimal occurs
when a less aggressive seller meets with a buyer that is more willing to take the risk of being
rejected. This work proposes new light on bargaining, introducing the role of suitable payment
for the involved partners. It shows that switching to a safer incentive leads to better deals for
sellers, while buyers, which switch to try to offset the risk, were actually worse off because
they let sellers take advantage of their lack of aggressiveness.
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Appendix B
Tables
Figure B.1: Incentive scheme matching in Stage 0, Late Phase by payment scheme
Notes: Coefficients from panel regressions (probit for acceptance dummy and xtreg for the other variables). We consider here the last 10
rounds of Stage 0. All results are considered as difference with seller and buyer choosing CS.
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Table B.2: The role of payment scheme sorting on acceptance rate and surplus share in Stage 0
Seller Buyer
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Acceptance SS accept1 SS accept1 Acceptance SS accept1 SS accept1
(Mean) (Mean) (SD) (Mean) (Mean) (SD)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Cumulative Scheme*Male 0.01 0.32 0.98 0.02 0.68 -1.49
(0.03) (0.70) (1.33) (0.03) (0.73) (1.34)
RLI*Male 0.04 -0.21 -0.61 -0.01 0.68 -0.80
(0.04) (0.68) (1.21) (0.04) (0.89) (2.09)
RLI*Female 0.03 -0.13 0.44 -0.02 0.47 -1.28
(0.06) (0.67) (1.45) (0.04) (0.72) (1.36)
Average Cheating (%) 0.05** 0.65*** 1.06**
(0.02) (0.24) (0.41)
Average Rentability (%) -0.84*** 3.04** -5.48*
(0.20) (1.50) (2.89)
Risk -0.00 -0.17 -0.32 0.00 -0.20 0.43
(0.01) (0.12) (0.21) (0.01) (0.15) (0.28)
Constant 0.51*** 3.30*** 4.99*** 1.02*** -3.24*** 6.76***
(0.03) (0.69) (1.20) (0.13) (0.96) (1.79)
Observations 188 188 185 188 182 174
R2 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.45 0.05 0.05
Notes: Dependent and independent variables are based on individual average and standard deviation of the final 10 rounds of Stage 0. Risk
measure goes from 0 (maximum risk averse) to 9 (maximum risk seeking). Seller’s cheat (%) is measured as difference vˆ−vvˆ . Buyer’s
rentability (%) measures the distance between price offer and message received vˆ−pvˆ .
1 Surplus share (SS) include only the accepted deals: the analysis is consistent when we analyze the surplus share including not accepted
contracts. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Chapter 4
A Hybrid Public Good Experiment
Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data
with D. Di Cagno, W. Güth, L. Panaccione
Abstract
Similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we suggest an elicitation method for exploring
the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good in the role of "leader" or
"follower". In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses
an independent contribution level as well as three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the
only adjusting player, learns that the other’s independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger
than the own one. To approximate the border cases of simultaneous contributing as well as
sequential contributions we systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based
on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one
occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing
the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels. Surprisingly,
the framing effect becomes stronger with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent
contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively
lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward
adaptation.
Keywords: Public goods, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism.
JEL: C91, C72, H41
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4.1. Introduction
Inspired by Revealed Preference theory (Samuelson 1938, Varian 2006), the Revealed Motive
approach of experimental economics 1 tries to infer motives like preference relations, aspiration
levels, inclinations towards risk and ambiguity, other-regarding concerns, etc. purely from
experimental choice data. In this paper, we do not question this but suggest an elicitation tech-
nique to assess more directly the motives when contributing in a public good and demonstrate
its potential by running an experiment with different treatments in order to show how its data
can be more informative.
Recently, other scholars have attempted a similar goal. Fischbacher and Gächter (2010),
for example, study experimentally a normal form version of a sequential public good game
with one randomly determined first mover and three followers. All four participants are asked
to choose an independent contribution and, as followers, for a response strategy specifying
their reaction to the leader’s choice. Here, the strategic uncertainty of the three followers, who
do not know the other followers’ response strategies, renders the interpretation of response
behavior ambiguous. To avoid this problem, we consider a two-player game ruling out strategic
uncertainty when “following”but maintain the advantage of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) to
elicit from each participant both the choice as “leader”as well as “follower”.
In our design, each participant chooses an independent contribution as well as adjusted
contributions depending on how the other’s independent contribution qualitatively compares
with the own one (see, related to this, Keser and van Winden, 2000 and, less closely, Kurzban
and Houser, 2005): adjustment conditions only on whether the other’s independent contribution
is higher than, lower than, or equal to the own one. Either none or only one contributor can
adapt the independent contribution according to a commonly known probability p, i.e. the
probability of one of them being allowed to adjust is the unique “within subject”treatment
variable.
We consider three different probability levels: low (p = 2.5%), middle (p = 33%), and
high (p = 49%). When the probability p of adjustment is low, it is very unlikely that either
contributor can adjust, hence the situation is close to a standard public good game with free
riding being dominant. As p increases, the nature of the game changes2: while the same
prediction for optimal choices follows from once repeated elimination of dominant strategies3,
it becomes more likely that one will be able to adapt; in this case the game gets closer to a trust
1See Di Cagno et al. (2015) for a more fundamental discussion of the (dis-)advantages of the Revealed Motive
approach in experimental research.
2Another interpretation of the nature of our game refers to the leadership in voluntary contribution games, see
e.g. Croson et al. (2005) and Levati et al. (2007).
3Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) rely on this stronger rationality postulate and thus somewhat weaken the
dilemma aspect of their experimental game.
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game. Indeed, suppose that the probability of adjustment is p = 49%: since the probability
that none can adapt is only 2%, contributors essentially face a symmetric trust game with both
players assuming the trustor and the trustee role with 49% probability each.4 In this case, the
independent contribution can be interpreted as a trustor investing in trustworthiness, while the
adapted contributions reveal trustworthiness of a trustee. Altogether we thus vary the crucial
parameter p rather systematically but maintain its generality, i.e. we only approximate but
never directly analyse the border cases of truly simultaneous, p = 0, respectively sequential
contributions, p = 1/2. The obvious advantage of this is that by varying only one numerical
parameter, p, we can approach very different games.
Our two between subjects treatments differ in the way how contributions are adjusted. In the
Pure Adjustment (thereafter PA) treatment, subjects state an independent contribution and then
are asked what to add to or subtract from the independent contribution in order to determine the
final contribution. To maintain the independent contribution, the adjustment can be set equal to
zero.
This way of asking for adjustment of (independent) contributions may trigger quite different
reactions such as:
• opposition/inertia/resistance to change (“I want to maintain my independent contribu-
tion!");
• an obligation to change when new information is provided;
• a desire for flexibility allowing for both, positive and negative adjustments.
To control for this (demand) effect, we consider the Contribution Choice (thereafter CC)
treatment: contributors choose an independent contribution and then the contributions by which
they react to qualitative information. One basic reason for framing the contribution adjustments
differently is that framing effects are often shown to influence behavior in one-off decision tasks
and maybe used for nudging (see Thaler and Sunstein, 2008) at least inexperienced decision
makers. However it is largely unexplored whether framing effects persist when decision makers
become quite experienced. Our hypotheses that learning weakens the learning effect could,
however, not be confirmed. Another reason is more subtle: having to adjust one’s independent
contribution seems slightly more cumbersome than deciding anew. Thus the two frames may
not question the choice set but possibly their cognitive demands.
4Similarly to Berg et al. (1995) and the experiment of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) trustor and trustee
can choose among different contribution levels. However, trustees can condition their choice only on qualitative
information.In this sense our setup resembles sequential Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD) experiments with binary choice
sets.
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Rather than running our hybrid public game (HPG hereafter) just once, we wanted to
explore how experience affects play without endangering the one-off character of the game.
We thus let participants play recursively but with new randomly selected partners.
Given our experimental design, we are able to test how contributions react to the different
frames and probabilities of adjustment across rounds of playing the HPG. To anticipate our
findings: average independent and adapted contributions are generally higher in treatment CC
and increasing with the probability of adaptation. The greater probability of adjustment sustains
more voluntary cooperation across plays of HGP with this effect being stronger in treatment
CC. The finding is surprising since we expect experience to render participants more immune
to framing. In our view it is striking how participants react to the changing nature of the game
due to different probabilities of adaptation.
Concerning whether and how contributions are adapted we can state the following: coincid-
ing independent contributions are mostly maintained and one reacts to a higher independent
contribution by the other, on average, by an increase but to a lower one by a quite stronger
decrease. The first result confirms earlier findings, Croson et al. (2005) report that participants
like to match the contributions of others which could be due to conformity seeking, as claimed
by Carpenter (2004). However, Carpenter refers to conformity seeking as “copying the most
relevant behavior in a population”. In our set up with limited feedback information on others’
behavior, conformity seeking can be interpreted in two ways: either as coincidence of indepen-
dent contributions so that no adjustment establishes conformity or as tendencies to adjust in the
direction of the other’s independent contribution. In our context, as well as for Fischbacher
and Gächter (2010), such conformity seeking could also be implied by let-down aversion or
conditional cooperation.5
Our findings also suggest that conditional cooperation is affected by the salience of con-
ditioning. In particular, higher probability of adaptation implies higher and more persistent
cooperation, whereas for low probability of adaptation the dynamics of contributions are con-
sistent with those of standard public good experiments, even with those using random strangers
matching (see e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2000). Similar to Fischbacher et al. (2001), we also
consider different types of contributors, namely conditional cooperators and exploiters, or
free-riders.6 A conditional cooperator increases (decreases) her independent contribution if
the other’s independent contribution is larger (smaller) and does not adapt if it is equal to the
own one. An exploiter, or free-rider, never contributes, either independently or when adjusting.
Quite naturally, we expect a monotonic reaction to p and more free-riding behavior for small p
due to the weaker trust game character.
5This might explain why Carpenter (2004) wants to define conformity seeking more distinctively.
6Even though we use the same, natural, terminology for types, there are differences rendering our findings not
directly comparable to those of Fischbacher et al. (2001).
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Finally, although we first of all want to propagate and demonstrate one elicitation method
to collect more informative experimental choice data in order to more easily and profoundly
assess their motives, one may ask whether our experimental scenario has any analogue in the
field. Although many collective action tasks involve large numbers of interacting parties, the
use of only two in a lab study seems less problematic as the - in the field quite frequent - role
distinction of “leading”and “following”. Thus what is more crucial is that one can adapt only in
the light of qualitative rather than quantitative information about “leader”choices by different
participants. In our view, this could be due to a third party which intentionally provides only
such information, for example, in order to inspire equal contributions what could weaken
post-decisional regret. Actually allowing for adaptation, even more than just once as in our
design, could be a rather useful and innovative way to avoid intragroup conflicts in collective
action tasks. Otherwise we admit that it is hard to justify exact information when independent
contributions are equal but rather qualitative information only when not. If at all information
is vague, it would be more realistic to distinguish “pretty equal”and “considerably larger,
respectively smaller”. To justify field relevance one then would have to find field situations
with such vague comparison. Rather than simply referring to “noise”we admit this to be rare in
the field.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the experimental protocol. The
descriptive and statistical data analysis is presented in section 4.3. We analyze the independent
contributions and adjustments both from a static point of view across conditions as well as
dynamically. Section 4.4 concludes.
4.2. Experimental protocol
In each experimental session, participants choose their contributions for 45 successive rounds,
grouped in three phases of 15 rounds. Phases differ in the probability p of adjustment, which
is either low (p = 2.5%), middle (p = 33.3%), or high (p = 49%). Since each participant can
adjust with probability p, the probability that none of them will adjust is equal to 1−2p. The
probability level in each phase is commonly known and occurs in increasing or decreasing
sequences for a given session i.e. the increasing, respectively decreasing probability sequence
is implemented “between subjects”. In all rounds of a given phase, subjects are randomly
matched with a different anonymous partner. Participant were informed about this random
rematching to weaken repeated game effects.
In each round, participants are endowed with 9 tokens (1 token = 0.5e) and state their
independent contribution. Without knowing the other’s independent contribution, participants
then adjust their independent contribution conditional on whether the other’s independent
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contribution is lower than, equal to, or greater than the own one. After the independent and the
adjustment (for the three cases) choices, the computer − according to p − randomly selects
whether one and, if so, which participant can adjust her independent contribution.
The payoffs are computed at the end of each round according to the standard public good
linear payoff function:7
πi = 9− ci+0.8(ci+ c j) (4.1)
Here ci (c j) is the actual contribution of subject i ( j), which is equal to the independent
(adjusted) contribution if subject i does not (does) adapt. In the experiment all choices are
restricted to integers. An MPCR of .8 may seem high but implies the same efficiency gains of
individual contributions as in the standard 4-person games with one MPCR of .4; the 2-person
interaction is imposed, as mentioned above, to exclude strategic uncertainty when following.
Finally, in spite of most other studies, the (random) stranger matching protocol is used since we
are interested in the motives guiding the contribution choices of “leader” and “follower” and
not in those behind repeated play effects as typically studied by supergame experiments.
4.2.1. Treatments
The experiment distinguishes two framing treatments, differing in the way how contributions
are adjusted:
- in the Pure Adjustment treatment (TR PA), each subject chooses her independent contribu-
tion c0i − with 06 c0i 6 9− and subsequently states the amount ∆?i − with ?∈ {=,+,−}
and −c0i 6 ∆?i 6 9− c0i − to be added to (if positive) or subtracted from (if negative) the
independent contribution in case the other’s independent contribution is higher than (+),
lower than (−) or equal to (=) her own one.
- in the Contribution Choice treatment (TR CC), each subject chooses her independent
contribution c0i − with 06 c0i 6 9 − and subsequently states the adjusted contributions
c?i , with ? ∈ {+,−,=} and 0 6 c?i 6 9 in case the other’s independent contribution is
higher than (+), lower than (−) or equal to (=) her own one.
In TR PA the actual contribution of subject i is c0i +∆
?
i if she is randomly selected to adjust,
and c0i otherwise. Similarly, in TR CC the actual contribution of subject i is c
?
i if she is randomly
selected to adjust, and c0i otherwise.
7We use the term “project” in the experiment. This type of payoff function has been disseminated by Marvell
and Ames (1979, 1980, 1981).
54
Observe that in both “between subjects” treatments the same final contributions are available
since in TR PA any c?i with 0 6 c?i 6 9 can be realized via appropriate adaptations ∆?i with
−c0i 6 ∆?i 6 9− c0i .
4.2.2. Sequences
As “within subjects treatments” the probability levels could differ across phases in the following
way:
- in sequence A probability levels are increasing, hence p = 2.5% in phase 1, p = 33.3%
in phase 2, and p = 49% in phase 3;
- in sequence B probability levels are decreasing, hence p = 49% in phase 1, p = 33.3%
in phase 2, and p = 2.5% in phase 3.
The structure of the experiment is summarized in Table 4.1.
4.2.3. Feed-back information and payment
At the end of each round, participants are reminded of
• their independent contribution;
• their potential adaptations (either ∆?i in TR PA or c
?
i in TR CC);
• the probability p of adapting in the current phase.
Moreover, they are informed about
• the random event (based on probability p) allowing possible adjustment of at most one
independent contribution;
• their own payoff in the current round computed according to (1).
When one of the paired participants can adjust the independent contribution, the one who
could adapt is told only whether the other’s contribution was greater than, lower than or equal
to the own one, while the other is only told that the partner could adapt. In addition, the own
final payoff is communicated to either participant. When participants could not adapt, they are
told that no adaptation has occurred and their own final payoff.
At the end of the session the computer randomly selects one round of each phase for
payment. Each individual earns the sum of payoffs, corresponding to these (three) selected
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rounds. In addition, each participant received a show-up fee of e2.50. Subjects were paid in
cash privately at the end of each session.
We ran 8 sessions at the laboratory of the Max Planck Institute in Jena. A total of 252
students (7 sessions of 32 participants plus 1 session of 28) were recruited among the under-
graduate population of Jena University using Orsee (Greiner, 2004).
Subjects were provided with a hard copy of the instructions, which were read aloud by
the experimental proctor (for an English translation of the instructions see Appendix). The
experiment was fully computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Overall, subjects spent about 90 minutes in the laboratory, and earned on average e20.50,
with slightly higher average payment in treatment CC, both sequences. Minimum earnings are
higher in treatment PA, while maximum payments are higher in sequence B, in both treatments.
Table 4.1: The experimental protocol
Treatments Pure Adjustment (PA): Conditional Contribution (CC):
Adjustment via ∆?i Adjustment via c
?
i
Sequence A Sequence B Sequence A Sequence B
Sessions 2 2 2 2
Phase 1 2.5% 49% 2.5% 49%
Phase 2 33.3% 33.3% 33.3% 33.3%
Phase 3 49% 2.5% 49% 2.5%
Rounds per phase 15 15 15 15
Subjects per session 32 32 32 32
Subjects 60(†) 64 64 64
Average earning (e) 20 20.19 20.36 20.31
Min. earning (e) 16.5 16.5 14.5 14.5
Max. earning (e) 23.5 26.5 24.5 25.5
† In one session of Treatment PA, sequence A: 28 subjects instead 32.
Participation fee: e2.5.
4.3. Hypotheses
We test several hypotheses concerning framing, sequence of probabilities, dynamics of con-
tributing, and types of contributors.
• for framing, we test whether contributions differ due to the mode of adaptation. Although
treatment PA and CC feature the same choice sets, we predict a stronger persistence of
independent contributions when these are ∆-adapted as in treatment PA than when they
are c-adapted as in treatment CC;
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• for sequence of probabilities, we expect no persistent sequence effects but strong mono-
tonic reactions of contributions to p with more free riding for smaller p due to the weaker
trust game character;
• regarding the contribution dynamics, framing effects should disappear with experience
and final contributions decrease across the 15 rounds within phases;
• for types of contributors, we expect, consistently with previous findings, more conditional
contributors than freeriders.
4.3.1. Treatment and probability effects
Our first result confirms a significant framing effect: the way in which subjects state their
adapted contributions (either via ∆-adaptation or via c-adaptation) affects the level of indepen-
dent and adjusted contributions, even though choice sets are the same in both treatments.
Results 1: Average independent contributions are significantly higher in treatment CC than
in treatment PA. Average adapted contributions are generally higher in treatment CC than in
treatment PA (see Table 4.2).
Table 4.2: Contributions by sequences and treatments†
Sequence A and Sequence B
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
CC 4.268 0.270 -0.230 -1.594 4.537 4.038 2.674 4.020
PA 4.035 0.502 -0.205 -1.518 4.537 3.830 2.517 3.762
0.00 0.00 0.35 0.09 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sequence A
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
CC 4.277 0.275 -0.173 -1.753 4.552 4.104 2.524 3.997
PA 4.049 0.547 -0.129 -1.626 4.596 3.920 2.423 3.761
0.01 0.00 0.21 0.06 0.62 0.03 0.16 0.00
Sequence B
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
CC 4.258 0.264 -0.287 -1.435 4.522 3.971 2.823 4.044
PA 4.022 0.459 -0.276 -1.417 4.481 3.746 2.605 3.763
0.00 0.00 0.79 0.76 0.64 0.01 0.00 0.00
†Test for difference in contribution means are reported in in the P-values line
TR CC is based on 2880 observations and TR PA counts 2770 observations.
Average independent contributions are significantly higher in treatment CC than in treatment
PA when pooling the data of sequence A and sequence B as well as when considering them
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separately (see Table 4.2, column 1). The latter reveals that the order of probabilities (increasing
vs. decreasing) does not affect average independent contributions.
Regarding adjusted contributions, the pattern is similar: in treatment CC average c=i
and c−i are significantly higher than in treatment PA, while c
+
i is not statistically different
across treatments (see Table 4.2, columns 5-7). This latter result is due to the fact that ∆+i is
significantly higher in treatment PA than in treatment CC and therefore offsets the lower level
of the independent contribution observed in treatment PA.
Similarly to the independent contributions, the pattern of the adjusted contributions is
independent of the sequence of probabilities. Evidently, anticipating whether and how one
revises triggers more independent and final voluntary cooperation in treatment CC than in
treatment PA. This, of course, questions all purely outcome-based social preferences and
suggest that the mode of adaptation triggers partly specific reasons when and how to adapt, for
example, inertia or resistance to change or an obligation to react to new information which
could inspire c0i -choices allowing for flexibility in adaptation, e.g. via c
0
i = 4 or 5.
According to the last column of Table 4.2 the actual final contribution is on average greater
in treatment CC irrespective of sequence, a result consistent with those for independent and
adjusted contributions.
Table 4.3 focuses on probability effects and confirms a significant and monotonic probability
effect.
Results 2: Average independent and adapted contributions are generally increasing with the
probability of adjustment (see Table 4.3)
When considering both (between subjects) treatments together, we find that independent
as well as adapted contributions c+i and c
=
i are higher in phases with higher probability. In
case of c−i the value remains constant across probabilities regardless of the frame, i.e. mode of
adaptation. When considering each treatment separately, independent and adjusted contributions
steadily increase from low to high probability (see Table 4.3, column 1 and columns 5-7).
Moreover for ∆−adjustments, Table 4.3 confirms that average ∆+i is decreasing, while average
∆=i and ∆
−
i are increasing in absolute value with probability p (see Table 4.3, columns 2-4).
These results justify our arguments, put forward in the introduction: when the adjustment
probability p is low the game perceived as a usual public good game while, when p is high, it is
seen as a trust game. Subjects seem to realize this and modify their contributions accordingly.
In particular, for p = 49%, independent contributions are higher since as trustor one likes to
invest more in trustworthiness. However, since for p = 49% average ∆+i is lowest, using the
jargon of trust games, we can say that rewarding such trusting is rather limited. Furthermore,
since ∆−i is highest in absolute value, there is a strong negative reaction when the other’s
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investment in trust is lower than the own one which suggests self-serving concerns: one reacts
less strongly when adjustment is costly than when it is favorable.
To further investigate limited rewarding of trust and self-serving concerns, we introduce a
measure of expected ∆−adjustments of independent contribution which is defined as follows:8
d ji (c
0
j) = p∆
?
i (c
0
j) where ∆
?
i (c
j
0) =

∆−i if c
0
i > c
0
j
∆=i if c0i = c
0
j
∆+i if c
0
i < c
0
j
(4.2)
We consider the value of d ji using actual data and data from simulated pairs of subjects, obtained
by pairing each subject with every other subject in the same round of the same sequence in a
given treatment.9,10
Note that simulated data differ from actual ones since they neglect individual feedback
effects stemming from the information received by subjects e.g. about their current payoff after
each round. Therefore, this simulation provides a robustness check of our sample results.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 report average actual and simulated d ji and additionally average values
of final, i.e. after adjustment, total contribution both for actual and simulated data. Table 4.4
relates expected adjustments and public good provision to frame: actual expected adjustments
do not vary across treatments, hence they are not related to frame, while the opposite is true for
final public good provision, which is significantly affected by frame and significantly higher
in treatment CC. Simulated expected adjustment is larger (in absolute value) in treatment CC,
irrespective of sequences, and the same holds for public good provision.11
Table 4.5 relates expected adjustments and public good provision to probability level
p. Irrespective of treatment, average d ji from actual data is negative and, in absolute value,
increasing more than proportionally with adjustment probability. These results confirm our
intuition that, when the game is closer to a trust game, rewarding trust is, on average, more
dominated by self-serving concerns, whence the negative expected adjustment.
In the larger set of simulated data we find a similar pattern for d ji which, however, seems
more pronounced in the CC treatment. This suggests that the trust game interpretation may
8Observe that d ji (c
0
j) can be equivalently expressed as c
0
i − [(1− p)c0i + p(c?i (c0j))], that is as the difference
between the independent contribution and the expected adjusted contributions.
9For example, each individual in, say, the third round of phase 3 in the session with increasing probability
under treatment PA is matched with every other subject in the third round of phase 3 in the session with increasing
probability under treatment PA.
10We were able to implement this procedure thanks to the strategy (vector) method adopted in the experiment;
it results in 703,620 observations regarding independent contributions and adapted contributions.
11We do not report simulated data on independent contributions and adjustments: their averages are the same as
those in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Since the same observations are used repeatedly, standard errors decrease drastically
and the frame and probability effects appear as highly significant.
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Table 4.3: Contributions by treatments and probabilities†
Treatment PA and CC
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
p = 2.5% 3.723 0.517 -0.051 -1.178 4.240 3.672 2.545 3.702
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.43 0.00
p = 33.3% 4.248 0.394 -0.268 -1.652 4.642 3.980 2.596 3.702
0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.25 0.02 0.41 0.77
p = 49% 4.489 0.241 -0.335 -1.840 4.730 4.154 2.649 3.979
Treatment PA
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
p = 2.5% 3.549 0.590 -0.056 -1.103 4.139 3.492 2.446 3.524
0.00 0.61 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00
p = 33.3% 4.092 0.560 -0.287 -1.615 4.652 3.805 2.477 3.831
0.00 0.00 0.77 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.28
p = 49% 4.465 0.355 -0.272 -1.837 4.820 4.192 2.627 3.932
Treatment CC
c0i ∆
+
i ∆
=
i ∆
−
i c
+
i c
=
i c
−
i ci
p = 2.5% 3.891 0.446 -0.046 -1.251 4.338 3.845 2.640 3.875
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.46 0.01
p = 33.3% 4.399 0.233 -0.249 -1.688 4.632 4.150 2.711 4.162
0.28 0.15 0.00 0.07 0.93 0.76 0.66 0.18
p = 49% 4.513 0.130 -0.395 -1.843 4.642 4.117 2.669 4.023
†Test for difference in contribution means are reported in in the P-values line (between p = 2.5% vs. 33.3% and p = 33.3% vs. 49%).
Table 4.4: d ji and public good provision (PGP) by sequences and treatments
†
Sequence A and Sequence B
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
CC -0.269 -0.270 8.040 8.010
PA -0.256 -0.250 7.525 7.561
0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sequence A
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
CC -0.315 -0.312 7.993 7.940
PA -0.294 -0.287 7.523 7.507
0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sequence B
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
CC -0.223 -0.228 8.088 8.080
PA -0.220 -0.217 7.526 7.609
0.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
† Test for difference in contribution means are reported in in the P-values line for frame effect.
∗ Public good provision is final contribution to public good: PGP= ci + c j
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be more salient for treatment CC featuring less rewarding of trust and more pronounced
self-serving concerns.
Finally, public good provision has a similar pattern in simulated and actual data: it increases
with probability p in treatment PA, while it decreases between p = 33.3% and p = 49% for
treatment CC. As probability p increases, the independent contribution becomes larger whereas
the magnitude of the adjustments ∆ decreases. The final contributions reflect this double effect.
Table 4.5: d ji and total public good provision (PGP) by treatments and probabilities
†
Treatment PA and CC
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
p = 2.5% -0.014 -0.013 7.405 7.406
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p = 33.3% -0.272 -0.270 7.998 7.994
0.00 0.00 0.70 0.26
p = 49% -0.501 -0.497 7.957 7.978
Treatment PA
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
p = 2.5% -0.012 -0.011 7.048 7.044
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p = 33.3% -0.263 -0.249 7.661 7.704
0.00 0.00 0.16 0.00
p = 49% -0.494 -0.489 7.865 7.936
Treatment CC
Data Actual Simulated Actual Simulated
d ji PGP
∗
p = 2.5% -0.017 -0.016 7.750 7.746
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p = 33.3% -0.281 -0.290 8.324 8.266
0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
p = 49% -0.509 -0.505 8.047 8.019
† Test for difference in contribution means are reported in in the P-values line (2.5% vs. 33.3%; 33.3% vs. 49%).
∗ Total public good provision: PGP= ci + c j
4.3.2. Dynamics of contributions
In this section we analyze the trend of independent and adapted contributions over the 15
rounds of each phase. Recall that, due to the random stranger matching protocol, there are no
reputation nor reciprocity effects across rounds. Therefore, the evolution of choices reveals
mainly how individual intrinsic motivation to cooperate is affected by past play.
Figure 4.1 reports the dynamics of independent and adjusted contributions for each proba-
bility level without distinguishing between treatment PA and CC (as we do in Figure 4.2). The
dynamics of contributions react significantly to the probability of adaptation since, when p
is low, subjects tend to behave less cooperatively across rounds. With the help of Table 4.6
(columns 1-3), we can confirm that for p = 2.5% and p = 33.3% independent contributions c0i
steadily decline across rounds, while they remain constant when p = 49%. The first finding is
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consistent with standard results on public good games, also − however weaker − for “random
strangers”, while the second is consistent with experimental findings on repeated trust game.12
Conditional contributions(see Figure 4.1) for p = 2.5% and p = 33.3% steadily decline across
rounds irrespective of the qualitative information regarding the other’s contribution. When
p = 49%, the adapted contributions c+i are essentially constant, while the contributions c
=
i and
c−i are slightly declining. These results are confirmed by Table 4.6 and are summarized in the
following
Result 3: Greater probability p sustains more voluntary cooperation, independently of the
qualitative information regarding other’s independent contribution.
Figure 4.2 shows that the decline in independent contributions is more pronounced in
treatment PA than in treatment CC when p = 2.5%, while the dynamics of independent con-
tributions are similar for the two treatments when p = 33.3%. When p = 49%, independent
contributions slightly decline in treatment PA, while they remain essentially constant in treat-
ment CC. Adapted contributions follows a similar trend: the decline, when significant, is
more pronounced in treatment PA than in treatment CC, with the exception of c−i . This latter
feature confirms the observation, put forward in the analysis of the expected adjustment, that
treatment CC reinforces the trust game nature of high adaptation probability, while treatment
PA reinforces the public good game nature of low adaptation probability. These results are
confirmed by the data in Table 4.6 (columns 4-6 and columns 7-9) and summarized in the
following
Result 4: When the probability of adaptation is low, the decline in voluntary cooperation is
more pronounced in treatment PA; when the probability of adaptation is high, the persistence
of voluntary cooperation is higher in treatment CC.
Figure 4.1 also reveals that adaptations ∆+i are (positive and) higher when p = 2.5% than
when p = 49%, and higher in treatment PA than in treatment CC. Furthermore, adaptations
∆−i are (negative and) higher in absolute value when p = 49% than when p = 2.5%. Overall,
these results suggest that, when p = 49%, reward of trust remains limited across rounds and
that self-serving concerns are persistent.
Table 4.7 analyzes the contribution dynamics as influenced by lagged contributions and
lagged adjustments. The baseline specification is:
c0it =αRoundit+β1c
0
it−1+β2(c
0
it−1)
2+β3c0−it−1+γPOit−1+ρ1∆
+
i,t−1+ρ2∆
=
i,t−1+ρ3∆
−
i,t−1+θi+vit
12See Ledyard (1995) for a survey on public good games. On trust games, see Berg et al. (1995) and Glaeser et
al. (2000).
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(a) Adjustment Probability p = 2.5%
(b) Adjustment Probability p = 33.3%
(c) Adjustment Probability p = 49%
Notes: Average values in each round. •/c0i +/c+i ◦/c=i /c−i
Figure 4.1: Independent and adjusted contributions
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(a) Treatment PA, p = 2.5% (b) Treatment CC, p = 2.5%
(c) Treatment PA, p = 33.3% (d) Treatment CC, p = 33.3%
(e) Treatment PA, p = 49% (f) Treatment CC, p = 49%
Notes: Average values in each round. •/c0i +/c+i ◦/c=i /c−i
Figure 4.2: Independent and adjusted contributions by treatment
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where the dependent variable is the independent contribution c0it . The explanatory variables are
lagged contribution c0it−1, squared lagged contribution (c
0
it−1)
2 to control for possible non-linear
correlations, lagged payoffs, and lagged adjustments (∆+i,t−1,∆
=
i,t−1,∆
−
i,t−1). The estimation
method is OLS with robust errors clustered on individuals.13
Results in Table 4.7 confirm that the lagged independent contribution has a significant
positive effect for any frame and any probability level, while the squared lagged contribution
does not significantly affect the independent contribution. The effect of lagged adjustment is
mostly significant for ∆+i,t−1 and ∆
−
i,t−1. This observation suggests inertia in stating independent
contributions.
Result 5: Independent contributions are positively and significantly affected by the previous
contributions.
In closing this section, let us consider the trust game character in the experimental setup
of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). Differently from our experiment, they exclude that
independent contributions alone determine the final payoff what occurs in our setup with
probability 1−2p varying from only 2% (when p= 49%) to 95% (when p= 2.5%). Therefore,
the independent choices in their experiment cannot be interpreted as contributions without
conditioning as in the usual public good game. Each independent contribution corresponds
to the trustor’s choice in one of four equally likely trust games (in normal form) where each
trustor confronts the three other players as trustees.
If applied to our design with two players, the protocol of Fischbacher and Gächter (2010)
would have implied a probability of adjustment p= 50%, a borderline case due to 1−2p= 0%
which we approximated via p = 49%. Hence, when comparing our findings with those of
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), e.g. on the dynamics of voluntary cooperation for repeated
play by random strangers, one should concentrate on p = 49%. For this case, we observe a
rather high and persistent level of cooperation which, in the setup of Fischbacher and Gächter
(2010) might be endangered by free-riding attempts of the three trustees−a phenomenon which
we excluded by selecting a two-player game. This, in turn, may trigger a decline of voluntary
cooperation for large p due to the strategic uncertainty when “following” (Fischbacher and
Gächter (2010) did not explore experience effects) .
13Additionally, we estimated all specifications of Table 4.7 with random and fixed effects (the latter is preferred
over random effects checking at the Hausman test), using Tobit with robust standard errors and finally the Arellano-
Bond linear dynamic panel-data estimation method using Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) with robust
standard errors. However, some specifications still have a significant second order correlation (p(ar1)< 0.05 and
p(ar2)< 0.05), implying that their estimates are inconsistent. Generally all specifications are consistent with the
results of this section.
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Table 4.6: Contributions and adjusted contributions through rounds†
Treatment PA and CC PA CC
Probability 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49%
c0i
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Round -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.00 -0.08*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03* -0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 4.15*** 4.57*** 4.51*** 4.18*** 4.43*** 4.55*** 4.11*** 4.71*** 4.47***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.24) (0.22) (0.27) (0.28) (0.26)
Observations 3780 3780 3780 1860 1860 1860 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F 20.28 12.82 0.07 27.47 9.97 0.55 3.25 11.97 0.29
c+i
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Round -0.05*** -0.02* -0.01 -0.06*** -0.02 -0.02 -0.03* -0.02 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 4.62*** 4.83*** 4.78*** 4.66*** 4.83*** 5.00*** 4.59*** 4.82*** 4.58***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Observations 3780 3780 3780 1860 1860 1860 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F 14.87 3.44 0.30 14.19 1.69 1.58 3.13 1.75 0.19
c=i
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Round -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.02* -0.07*** -0.06*** -0.03** -0.03 -0.04** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 4.08*** 4.38*** 4.32*** 4.09*** 4.28*** 4.46*** 4.07*** 4.48*** 4.17***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16)
Observations 3780 3780 3780 1860 1860 1860 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F 18.03 17.75 2.81 20.81 13.41 3.97 2.61 5.64 0.18
c−i
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Round -0.03*** -0.02** -0.02** -0.05*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04** -0.03**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant 2.81*** 2.78*** 2.85*** 2.88*** 2.56*** 2.78*** 2.75*** 2.99*** 2.92***
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Observations 3780 3780 3780 1860 1860 1860 1920 1920 1920
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F 9.64 4.65 5.53 13.69 0.51 1.72 0.71 4.97 3.90
†OLS regressions. Coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) are reported
c?i , where ? ∈ {−,=,+}, is chosen directly in CC or via c?i = c0i +∆?i in PA.
Table 4.7: Independent contributions depending on lagged contributions, and lagged adjust-
ments
Treatment PA+CC PA CC
Probability 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49%
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
c0i,t−1 0.95*** 0.84*** 0.82*** 0.99*** 0.77*** 0.81*** 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.81***
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.15) (0.07) (0.08)
(c0i,t−1)
2 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c−i,t−1 -0.36 0.03 -0.06 -0.72*** -0.02 -0.15 0.12 0.03 0.01
(0.29) (0.08) (0.07) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.58) (0.12) (0.08)
Payoffi,t−1 0.53 -0.00 0.13 0.98*** 0.07 0.25 -0.07 -0.02 0.04
(0.36) (0.11) (0.09) (0.28) (0.15) (0.16) (0.72) (0.15) (0.10)
∆+i,t−1 0.12*** 0.05** 0.11*** 0.11** 0.10*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.03 0.08**
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
∆=i,t−1 -0.02 0.04 -0.07** 0.01 0.00 -0.12*** -0.06 0.07 -0.03
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
∆−i,t−1 0.12*** 0.04* 0.04* 0.11** 0.07** 0.06 0.14*** 0.02 0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02)
Constant -4.38 0.53 -0.61 -8.44*** -0.01 -1.58 0.94 0.62 0.18
(3.27) (0.96) (0.85) (2.51) (1.34) (1.42) (6.49) (1.39) (0.97)
Observations 3656 3780 3652 1800 1860 1796 1856 1920 1856
R2 0.66 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.73
F 333.87 494.14 505.92 135.05 253.96 246.15 273.03 264.30 298.70
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered by individuals.
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4.3.3. On modes of behavior
We finally analyze modes of behavior, mainly two types of contributors: conditional cooperators
and exploiters, or free-riders. With the help of our notation, we can define these two types of
behavior as follows:
Conditional cooperation:
• for c0i = 0: ∆
+
i > 0,∆
=
i = 0;
• for 0 < c0i < e: ∆
=
i = 0,∆
−
i < 0,∆
+
i > 0;
• for c0i = e: ∆
=
i = 0,∆
−
i < 0.
Exploitation (or Freeriding): c0i = 0, all ∆
?
i minimal.
As confirmed by data in Table 4.8, the share of free-riding choices is lower than that of
conditional cooperating choices. Furthermore, the share of free-riding choices is higher in
treatment PA, possibly due to the stronger cognitive demand of this treatment,14 and decreases
with probability p for both frames.15 On the other hand the frame is relevant only for p= 2.5%.
Result 6: Conditional cooperation is significantly more frequent than freeriding in both
treatments.
Our findings are consistent with those obtained by Fischbacher et al. (2001), who classify
subjects on the basis of “follower” contributions reacting to quantitative “leader” contributions.
They categorize roughly a third (30%) of their subjects as free riders and roughly half (50%) as
conditional cooperators. This experiment has been replicated, with some variations, at different
locations, and the results are generally confirmed. 16 However, results from single locations in
14In treatment PA, subjects are forced to adjust their independent contribution in order to determine a given
final contribution.
15The definition of the conditional cooperator does not exclude c0i = 0 what, however, is rarely observed in our
data. Indeed, conditional cooperators with c0i = 0 account for less than 10% of the observations, with nearly half
of these rare results (45%) concentrated on p = 2.5%.
16Kocher et al. (2008) ran the experiment at single locations in the United States, Austria, and Japan (the
original experiment by Fischbacher et al. (2001) was conducted in Switzerland) finding similar shares of types in
Austria and Japan, but significantly different ones in the United States with a higher proportion of conditional
cooperators (80.6%) and a lower one of free riders (8.3%). Herrmann and Thöni (2009) replicated the experiment
at four locations in Russia: the distribution of types is very similar across locations. Moreover, while the proportion
of conditional cooperators in this study is comparable to the one of Fischbacher et al. (2001), free riders account
only for 6.3% of the total. Thöni et al. (2009) ran the experiment with a large pool of subjects in Denmark: a vast
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different (countries and) cultures are questionable since local differences may matter more than
cultural ones.
Closer to our setting are the experiments by Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) and Fischbacher
et al. (2012), who try to assess the effects of using the strategy (vector) method when eliciting
cooperative preferences. With their methodology they classify roughly 55% of subjects as
conditional cooperators and 23% as free riders. They also confirm, consistently with other
repeatedly played public goods experiments, that contributions decline over time.
Table 4.9 replicates the dynamic analysis presented in Table 4.7 by adding as explanatory
variables the two behavioral types. The independent contribution is − as expected − negatively
correlated with free-riding behavior in the previous round while positively correlated with
previous conditional cooperation.
Table 4.10 shows how the probability of being either type is affected by past choices and
payoffs. Lagged independent contribution significantly affects only the probability of being
free-rider. Lagged adjustments ∆+i affect positively the probability of being conditionally
cooperative, independently of the probability of adjustment, and negatively the probability of
free-riding, in both cases with similar magnitude. Lagged adjustments ∆−i affect negatively
both tendencies, with higher magnitude for conditionally cooperating than free-riding.
Table 4.8: Type of contributions by treatment and sequence
Conditional Cooperator by sequences
Sequence A and B Sequence A Sequence B
CC and PA 0.295 0.318 0.273
CC 0.284 0.305 0.263
PA 0.307 0.333 0.283
T-test† (0.01) (0.02) (0.09)
Conditional Cooperator by probabilities
p = 2.5% T-test (2.5%−49%) p = 33.3% T-test (2.5%−33.3%) p = 49% T-test (33.3%−49%)
CC and PA 0.253 (0.00) 0.317 (0.00) 0.315 (0.84)
CC 0.235 (0.00) 0.009 (0.00) 0.306 (0.75)
PA 0.272 (0.00) 0.324 (0.00) 0.325 (0.97)
T-test† (0.01) (0.36) (0.21)
Exploiter by sequences
Sequence A and B Sequence A Sequence B
CC and PA 0.147 0.143 0.151
CC 0.167 0.154 0.181
PA 0.127 0.132 0.122
T-test† (0.00) (0.02) (0.00)
Exploiter by probabilities
p = 2.5% T-test (2.5%−49%) p = 33.3% T-test (2.5%−33.3%) p = 49% T-test (33.3%−49%)
CC and PA 0.183 (0.00) 0.135 (0.00) 0.125 (0.18)
CC 0.195 (0.00) 0.157 (0.00) 0.149 (0.47)
PA 0.170 (0.00) 0.112 (0.00) 0.099 (0.22)
T-test† (0.04) (0.00) (0.00)
† P-values in brackets for T-test on frame effect.
majority (70.2%) of subjects are conditional cooperators, while 13.9% are free riders. Martinsson et al. (2013)
replicated the experiment in Vietnam and Colombia finding similar distributions of types except for the proportion
of conditional cooperators (50% in Vietnam and 62.5% in Colombia). Moreover, when compared with the other
studies, the proportion of free riders, 4.2%, is lower than in Switzerland, Austria, Denmark and Japan.
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4.4. Conclusions
Evidence from public good experiments have shown that, in general, average contributions to
the public good are higher than theoretically predicted.17 To explain this finding, “warm glow”
or altruistic preferences have frequently been invoked. As observed by Gächter (2007), such
intrinsic motives leave one’s behavior independent of others’ contributions. However, individual
choices often depend on how others behave; in particular, most people are conditionally
cooperative: they mainly want to contribute if others do the same.18
We have contributed to the analysis of this behavior in public good games with a novel
experimental design, eliciting multidimensional choice data based on qualitative information.
In addition to multidimensional choices and use of the strategy vector method we have enlarged
our data set by simulating pairs of subjects in order to asses the robustness of our findings.
Our results reveal that conditional cooperation is affected by the salience of conditioning.
In particular, higher probability of adaptation implies higher and more persistent cooperation,
while the opposite holds for lower probability of adaptation. Moreover, reacting to coinciding
independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing, whereas when react-
ing to higher (lower) independent contributions there are average upward and, more strongly,
downwards effects in contributing. From the analysis of modes of behavior and their dynamics
we can confirm that being a “conditional cooperator” versus “free-rider” does not appear to
be an intrinsic characteristic, even though the proportions we find are consistent with those
found in the literature: such attitudes respond to framing and own past choices: in spite of some
inertia our data do not suggest persistent classification of subject types.
Our overall results (actual and simulated) could be used to suggest nudging via imposing
the more welfare enhancing frame since choice sets for independent and final contributions
are always the same. Such nudging would be in line with libertarian paternalism (Thaler and
Sunstein, 2003). From an institutional point of view, one would suggest to design public good
contribution schemes enhancing the role of trust (like our 49% setting). From a sequencing
point of view, one might want to schedule high probability adaptation early, strengthening,
respectively suggesting, the trust game character initially, similar to positioning healthy food
products at the entrance of supermarkets.
17See e.g. Ledyard (1995).
18Several recent studies looked for a classification of social preferences according to such ideas, see Cooper
and Kagel (2013) for a recent review.
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Table 4.9: Independent contribution and lagged behavior
Treatment PA+CC PA CC
Probability 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49%
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
c0i,t−1 0.86*** 0.76*** 0.71*** 0.88*** 0.64*** 0.76*** 0.82*** 0.88*** 0.67***
(0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.12) (0.16) (0.09) (0.12)
(c0i,t−1)
2 0.01 0.01* 0.02** 0.01 0.02*** 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.02*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c−i,t−1 -0.37 0.01 -0.08 -0.74*** -0.04 -0.16 0.12 0.03 -0.02
(0.29) (0.08) (0.07) (0.22) (0.11) (0.12) (0.57) (0.12) (0.08)
Payoffi,t−1 0.54 0.02 0.16* 1.00*** 0.11 0.26 -0.08 -0.02 0.08
(0.36) (0.10) (0.09) (0.28) (0.15) (0.16) (0.72) (0.15) (0.11)
∆+i,t−1 0.09** 0.03 0.10*** 0.10* 0.09** 0.17*** 0.07 0.00 0.05
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.04)
∆=i,t−1 -0.01 0.04 -0.06* 0.02 0.00 -0.12*** -0.05 0.05 -0.02
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
∆−i,t−1 0.13*** 0.05** 0.05** 0.11** 0.07** 0.07 0.16*** 0.04 0.04
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03)
Freeridert−1 -0.34* -0.33* -0.46** -0.42* -0.61** -0.25 -0.28 -0.10 -0.61**
(0.19) (0.18) (0.22) (0.23) (0.26) (0.32) (0.30) (0.24) (0.31)
Cond. Coop.t−1 0.09 0.10 0.05 -0.08 0.04 0.04 0.32** 0.19* 0.09
(0.11) (0.08) (0.09) (0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.16) (0.11) (0.16)
Constant -4.25 0.53 -0.56 -8.30*** 0.01 -1.52 1.19 0.65 0.16
(3.25) (0.96) (0.87) (2.52) (1.34) (1.47) (6.41) (1.40) (1.00)
Observations 3656 3780 3652 1800 1860 1796 1856 1920 1856
r2 0.66 0.74 0.71 0.63 0.71 0.69 0.69 0.77 0.73
F 268.96 402.04 408.39 114.13 211.65 194.53 226.52 217.76 269.99
OLS estimation. Robust standard errors in parenthesis clustered by individuals.
Table 4.10: Probit estimation for behavioral types†
Conditional Cooperator Freerider
Probability 2.5% 33.3% 49% 2.5% 33.3% 49%
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
Round -0.00 -0.00 -0.01* 0.01* 0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c0i,t−1 -0.09 0.00 -0.01 -1.36*** -1.26*** -1.19***
(0.09) (0.08) (0.07) (0.18) (0.12) (0.10)
(c0i,t−1)
2 0.02** 0.00 0.01 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.10***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
c−i,t−1 -0.12 0.03 0.09 0.82 -0.04 -0.03
(0.25) (0.10) (0.07) (0.59) (0.15) (0.12)
Payoffi,t−1 0.16 -0.04 -0.11 -1.06 0.04 0.01
(0.31) (0.12) (0.09) (0.74) (0.19) (0.15)
∆+i,t−1 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.27*** -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
∆=i,t−1 -0.10 0.12** 0.07 0.18*** -0.01 0.16***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05)
∆−i,t−1 -0.23*** -0.27*** -0.22*** -0.11*** -0.02 -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Constant -2.65 -0.94 -0.25 10.12 0.26 0.48
(2.83) (1.13) (0.83) (6.64) (1.73) (1.35)
Observations 3656 3780 3652 3656 3780 3652
Pseudo-R2 0.22 0.23 0.23 0.49 0.56 0.54
† Probit estimation for conditional cooperative and freeriding choices.
Dependent variable: binary decision to behave as conditional cooperator (or freerider).
Robust standard errors clustered by individuals in parenthesis.
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HPG – Treatment PA (both sessions) 
INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTICIPANTS  
Introduction 
 
Welcome to our experiment! 
During this experiment you will be asked to make several decisions, and so will 
the other participants. 
Please read the instructions carefully. Your decisions, as well as the decisions of 
the other participants will determine your payoff according to rules, which will 
be explained shortly. The tokens that you earn during the experiment will be 
converted to euros at the rate of 1 token = €0.50. In addition to the earnings from 
your decisions over the course of the experiment, you will receive a show-up fee 
of €2.50. 
Please note that hereafter any form of communication between the participants 
is strictly prohibited. If you violate this rule, you will be excluded from the 
experiment with no payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. 
The experimenter will come to you and answer your questions individually. 
 
Once you are ready to begin the experiment, please click on the ‘OK’ button on 
the screen. When everyone is ready, the experimenter will read the instructions 
aloud, and then the experiment will start.   
 
Description of the Experiment 
 
This experiment is fully computerized. You will be making your decisions by 
clicking on appropriate buttons on the screen. All the participants are reading the 
same instructions and taking part in this experiment for the first time, as you are. 
 
The experiment is composed by three phases (Phase 1, Phase 2, and Phase 3). 
Each phase consists of 15 identical rounds, in which you will be required to 
perform a Task as explained below. The whole experiment hence will consist of 
45 rounds. 
 
During the experiment, groups of 2 participants will be randomly formed, and in 
every round of the same Phase you will be interacting with a different 
participant (how to interact with the other will be explained shortly). In other 
words, you will never be interacting more than once with the same participant 
through the same Phase of the experiment. 
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Description of the Task 
 
In each round, you and the other will be endowed with nine (9) tokens. 
In each round, both you and the other participant will have to take decisions. 
 
(1) Firstly, you, as well as the other, have to decide, individually and 
independently, how many of the nine tokens you are endowed with 
you want to contribute to a project.  
During the experiment, with some probability you will have the 
possibility to modify your initial contribution (how to modify the 
contribution will be explained shortly).  
The probability with which you will be able to modify your 
contribution will be communicated before taking your first decision. 
The same level of probability applies to you and the other participant 
you interact with in every single round. 
There are three possible levels of probability: you could modify your 
contribution by 2,5%, 33,3% and 49%.  
The level of probability will remain fixed for all the rounds in a given 
Phase.  
In every Phase, the probability will be different, but as explained you 
will be informed about it before starting the tasks. 
 
(2) Secondly, after every participant has completed the first task, you, as 
well as the other, have to decide, individually and independently, how 
much you would like to modify your initial contribution in case you will 
you will be given the possibility to do so.  
More specifically, you will be asked to modify your contribution in the 
three following situations: 
 
- if the other has contributed to the project more than you; 
- if the other has contributed to the project less than you; 
- if the other has contributed to the project as much as you. 
 
For each of the three cases, you will be asked by how many tokens you want to 
modify your initial contribution. You can add at most as many tokens as nine 
minus your initial contribution. You can subtract at most as many tokens as your 
initial contribution. 
You will be asked by how many tokens you want to modify your initial 
contribution before knowing if the other has contributed more than you, less 
than you or as much as you.    
After all participants have taken the decision regarding the modified 
contribution, the computer will randomly select if any participant will adapt and 
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which participant is allowed to modify the initial contribution, and will 
communicate the outcome to both of you. 
Please note that there is always the possibility that neither you nor the other will 
be allowed to modify. 
 
The computer will work out and communicate to you if and how much your 
initial contribution will be adapted depending on both yours and the other 
participant’ decisions. 
 
In particular, if you have been selected to adapt, the computer will automatically 
adapt your contribution on the basis of the decision you have taken before (2) 
and, given the decision on contribution stated in (1) by the other participant that 
in the current round is interacting with you, and will show on your screen your 
payoff for this round. 
 
If instead the other has been selected to adapt, the computer will automatically 
adapt his/her contribution on the basis of the decision he/she has taken before 
(2) and, given the decision on contribution stated in (1) by you, and will show 
on your screen your payoff for this round. 
 
NOTE: The computer will not inform you about the size of the initial 
contribution of the other participant with whom you interact in each round, but 
it will tell you if his/her contribution has been greater, lower or equal to your 
initial contribution.   
 
Summing up, your payoff for each round will depend on: 
 
- your initial decision to contribute (1); 
- the probability that you (or the other) have to modify the former 
decision; 
- your decision on how much, if at all, to modify your initial 
contribution depending on the other’s initial decision to contribute; 
- the decision of the other on how much, if any, to modify his/her initial 
contribution  to your initial decision to contribute. 
 
Your payoff is determined in each round according to the following formula: 
 
9 – your final contribution + 0.8(your final contribution + the other’s final 
contribution) 
 
The final contribution is the one that you decide in (1), which is adapted 
according to what you decided in (2) if you are given the possibility to adapt. 
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Information Feedback 
 
Before proceeding to the next round, the computer will inform you of:  (i) your 
decisions (your initial contribution (1) and your decisions to adapt (2)); (ii) the 
probability to adapt of the current Phase and the result of the related lottery; (iii) 
if you or the other participant with whom you interact in this round or none of 
you, are allowed to adapt your initial contribution; (iv) your payoff for the 
current round. 
 
End of the Experiment 
 
After completing the experiment, that is when the 45 rounds will be over, a 
lottery administrated by the computer will randomly select one round for each 
Phases to be considered for payment and will display it on your screen numbers 
with the corresponding payoff you made in those rounds.  
 
Your total payoff from the experiment will be equal to the sum of: 
 
- the payoff that you realised in the selected round in Phase 1; 
- the payoff that you realised in the selected round in Phase 2; 
- the payoff that you realised in the selected round in Phase 3; 
- the participation fee.  
 
A summary screen will display the total points you have accumulated and the 
corresponding earnings in euros. Please remain at your cubicle until asked to 
come forward and receive payment for the experiment. 
 
After having finished the experiment, but before receiving your payoff, you will 
be asked also to fill up a short questionnaire about your demographics and other 
few questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 

Chapter 5
Gamblers or Investors? An Experiment
on the Almost-Winning Outcome
with C. Choirat and D. Di Cagno
Abstract
Near-miss outcomes are real-life situations which increase the perceived probability of the
occurrence of future successes. The Almost-Winning (AW) bias is the well-known cognitive
bias that makes individuals unable to distinguish between situations in which near misses signal
ability and situations in which near misses are completely meaningless, in the sense of being
unrelated to future (likelihood of) winning. The empirical and neurological evidence shows
that a near-miss increases gamblers’ willingness to play: AW triggers a dopamine response
similar to winning, in spite of no actual reward. Therefore, in a chance game, a sequence of AW
outcomes easily generates an “irrational” willingness to continue playing, and might become
a key factor in the development and maintenance of certain betting habits. We implement an
experimental setting aimed at checking the relevance of the AW bias among ordinary students
on order to evaluate its potential strength in absence of gambling pathologies. Two treatments
are implemented in two different frames, an investment game (IG) and a slot machine game
(SM), which try to avoid persistence at gaming.
Keywords: experiment, gambling, decision making under risk and uncertainty
JEL: C91, L83, D81
5.1. Introduction
Almost-Winning Outcomes (AW) are real-life situations which increase the perceived probabil-
ity of the occurrence of future successes; however, when chance is binding, near-miss outcomes
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are completely meaningless, since they indicate nothing about the future likelihood of winning.
The stemming cognitive bias makes individuals unable to distinguish between situations in
which near misses signal ability and those in which no ability is involved.
This bias is part of the natural instinct when we face uncertain settings: Getting close to the
goal increases the probability to achieve it in following trials. When gambling, the majority of
people wrongly rely on previous events to predict future outcomes. Gamblers tend to create
illusory links between independent events, forgetting or denying the exclusive randomness of
the outcome.
Chase and Clark (2010) showed that near-miss outcomes (or almost winning) may elicit a
dopamine response similar to winning, despite the fact that no actual reward is delivered. They
found that in different games, near miss outcomes still activate parts of the brain associated
with monetary wins and therefore increase individual willingness to play. This occurrence
is highly relevant when we consider the fact that gambling is increasing in most developed
countries, especially among young generations.
Previous empirical and theoretical research applies to compulsive gamblers, i.e., Benhsain et
al. (2004), Camerer et al (2004), Chase and Clark (2010), Cote et al. (2003), Coventry and
Hudson (2001), Coulombe et al. (1992), Dixon et al. (2010), Griffiths (1994), Ladouceur et al.
(1991), van Holst et al. (2010): For those subjects strong evidence shows that near-misses are
responsible in driving players to bet even though they keep losing. To the best of our knowledge
little research has been devoted to near-miss effects on non-compulsive gamblers (Myrseth et
al, 2010). Moreover, not many studies focus on the effect of AW outcomes on general decision
making in other situations (such as management research, medicine and investment).1
Our focus is testing near-miss outcomes unrelated to pathological gambling: Individuals should
recognize near-misses as meaningless signals in those situations that do not involve any degree
of skill.
This study is based on an experimental study with multiple periods aimed at analyzing the
almost winning bias through different information sets and decision-making contexts. We
propose a simple chance game where subjects can decide which share of their initial endowment
to allocate in a lottery: Thanks to our simple task, we are able to account for the effect of
near-miss bias on their willingness to play (measured by the number of tokens allocated in the
risky lottery).
We represent this chance game in two different framings: an investment game (IG) and a slot
machine game (SM).2 This is aimed to distinguish between the near-miss effect on players
1Near misses are seen as a possible distortion in decision making under risk and a miss opportunity of learning,
Dillon and Tinsley (2008)
2We define a chance game as a game where no skill or ability can help individuals to correctly forecast the
future outcome, think of a slot machine or picking a lottery number. Thus, our work focuses on the individual
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when they are facing a chance game framed as a gamble and a chance game framed as a
financial market. Since almost winning triggers a different cognitive process and the statistical
risk perception is distorted (Dillon and Tinsley, 2010), we want to check if changing the frame
distorts the individual’s perception of the game, and the underlying probabilities.3 Moreover,
individuals could have different arousal and sensation seeking depending on the framing in
which the game is proposed (Anderson and Brown 1984, Ladouceur et al. 1991).
Two different information settings are implemented in order to understand how to decrease
the number of erroneous perceptions by warning subjects on AW bias and independence of
events or disclosing the actual winning probabilities (nudging versus awareness).4
Through this experimental setting, we add new insights in near-miss effects, through three levels
of analysis. First, we identify overall a persistent effect of AW outcomes on next trials, showing
that also non-compulsive gamblers might be affected by the same cognitive bias. Surprisingly,
individuals who generally prefer to avoid risk are more responsive to AW outcomes. Second,
we want to see if framing matters in perceiving AW bias: We find that near-misses are binding
not only in a traditional gambling game, like the slot machine, but also in the investment game
(there is no significant difference in the AW bias across frames). Third, we discuss the role of
information in correcting the misinterpretation of AW outcomes. Both nudging and informing
are effective in reducing the willingness to choose the risky choice. Probability information
even helps people to correctly interpret the game and the AW bias tends to disappear.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the experimental protocol; descriptive
and statistical data analysis is presented in Section 5.3, including a last Section of robustness
check; final remarks and guidelines for future research are proposed in Section 5.4.
5.2. Experimental Protocol
We ran seven sessions with a total of 144 students 5, recruited among the undergraduate
population of Luiss University of Rome using Orsee (Greiner, 2004), at the laboratory Cesare.
All experimental sessions, based on three stages and a questionnaire, are fully computerized
using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).6 In each experimental session there are two stages with 20
representation of the near-miss outcomes in chance situations, where there is no possibility for the individual to
affect the game result.
3We think that also noise traders face the financial market as a lottery.
4Occasional gamblers show that reminders about independence of events decrease the number of erroneous
perceptions (Benhsain et al. 2004) and the motivation to pursue the game is weaker among participants who were
reminded.
5We ran five sessions with 24 participants each and two sessions with 12 subjects only.
6The experiment is based on different treatments and framings in order to disentangle the almost winning effect
from other effects. In this sense, a different set of instructions was provided to participants. English translation is
reported in Appendix D, dataset and analysis are available upon request.
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rounds each, in which the subjects face the basic task (Stage 1 and Stage 2 differ on the basis of
the information provided to subjects, as it will be explained in section 5.2.3). Stage 3 proposes
the Holt and Laury’s (2002) protocol to elicit individual risk attitude.
We run this game proposing two different frames in order to detect if the occurrence of AW
situations was more likely to affect experimental subjects when the same probabilistic decisions
are framed as a chance game or as a skill game: Investment Game framing and the Slot Machine
framing (IG and SM hereafter). Even if both framings reproduced the same chance environment,
they differ in the way in which the decision task was presented.
For each round of the basic task, proposed in Stage 1 and Stage 2, participants decide how to
allocate their endowment in a risky choice. In particular, in each round, participants decide
how much to allocate of the initial endowment of 10 ECU (Experimental Currency Unit, with a
conversion rate 1 ECU=e0.5) between a safe choice (keeping the money) and a risky choice.
The risky choice is represented by a lottery with two possible outcomes, depending on the
state of the world (respectively the good state, SG and the bad state, SB). The probability of
the good state (SG) is ph: when the good state occurs, the outcome consists of the amount of
experimental units bet in the risky option times a positive marginal return (the marginal rate
of return in the good state is h, where h > 1) which gives more than the initial investment. In
the bad state (SB) (which occurs with probability pl) individuals receive back their bet in the
risky option times a low marginal rate of return (we name it in the bad state l where l < 1). The
entire endowment (e) has to be allocated between the risky option (x1) and the amount kept
(x0), which is characterized by a marginal rate of return equal to 1. In this sense the final payoff
of each round is:
v(x1) =
{
lx1+ x0 if SG occurs
hx1+ x0 if SB occurs
(5.1)
Where x0 = e− x1 and h (l) is the marginal return of investing from the good (bad) state. We
impose ph, pl,h, l such that it is always optimal not to invest in the risky option for a risk-neutral
individual, in particular every time this condition holds ph < 1−lh−l (the maximization problem is
solved in Appendix D.1).
The result of each round is represented on the computer by a sequential set of images
reproducing the occurrence of bad or good state. Images differ depending on the frame of the
experimental session (see Instructions in Appendix D). After each round, payoff is calculated
and privately communicated to the participants.
To ensure the financial salience of each decision, only one period per stage was randomly
selected at the end of the experiment for payment (with no additional show-up fee). The final
result from the experiment was communicated at the end of Stage 3: The computer randomly
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selected one round from each stage and computed the final payment. After answering the final
questionnaire, subjects were individually paid.
5.2.1. Investment Game Framing (IG)
The IG frame proposes a game in which individuals choose how much to invest a given
endowment e in a risky set of three assets. The risky option is an exchange-traded fund (ETF)
that tracks a basket of assets related to three different (independent) markets: Microlift, Chip
Corporation and Doltech. The good state (SG), that is the winning state, is verified when all
three markets present a bullish trend with probability ph = 18 . The bad state (SB) occurs when
the outcome has at least one bear market with probability pl = 78 . We set the marginal return in
the good state h = 3 and the marginal return in the bad state l = 0.1.
In each round a scroll bar allows subjects to examine the 11 possible integer allocations
(investing from 0 to 10 ECU in the risky asset) before taking their decision; for each potential
investment the computer shows on the screen the possible result in terms of expected payoff, i.e.
the potential earnings in the good and bad state. Once subjects made their investing decision,
the computer selects the outcome of the three markets: the outcome of each of them will appear
sequentially on screen (either a green arrow pointing up or a red arrow pointing down first for
market Microlift, then Chip Corporation market and last for Doltech market).
We define the Almost Winning (AW hereafter) outcome when the first two markets are
bullish, but not the third one. Other sequences of AW drawn, which include just one market
bearing, might be included in the analysis; however, given the result is shown sequentially, it is
reasonable to think that the dopamine rises while the first two markets are bullish and only the
last one has a different trend, so we focus only on that sequence.
5.2.2. The Slot Machine Game Framing (SM)
The SM game proposes a game where individuals choose how much to bet of a given endowment
e on a Slot Machine line with three cells. The risky option is represented by random draws of
different icons representing fruit and "BAR" symbol. The good state (SG), that is the winning
outcome, occurs when 3 "BAR" symbols appear on the subject’s screen with probability ph = 18 .
The bad state (SB) occurs when at least one symbol drawn from the slot machine is different
from "BAR" with probability pl = 78 . We set the marginal return in the good state h = 3 and
the marginal return in the bad state l = 0.1.
In each round, participants can decide how many ECU to bet on the slot machine, given their
initial endowment of 10 ECU, and how much they prefer to keep. A scroll bar allows the
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individual to examine the 11 possible bets and for each potential bet the possible earnings in
the good and the bad state. Then the slot machine appears, rolling three different images, and
sequentially the cells stop to one symbol. We define the AW when "BAR" occurs in the first
two cells, but not in the last one. Each round works as described in Section 5.2.1 and it is
characterized by the same steps and layout.
5.2.3. Information on Almost-Winning
Each treatment (IG and SM) is divided by stages. In particular, Stage 1 is common to all
sessions: After explaining the game structure, individuals played 20 rounds without any
disclosure on probabilities or additional game rules.7
At the end of Stage 1 we elicit the probability beliefs of participants by asking them to guess
the probability of winning among several options. Stage 2 differs from the first one in the
following way:
1. Stage 2A in which individuals were informed on the probability of the good state, which
is ph = 18 . We call this stage the "Probability Stage."
2. Stage 2B in which individuals were informed about the possible effect of almost-winning
outcomes, underlying the independence of each round played. We call this stage the
"Warning Stage."8
In Stage 3, equal for all sessions, subjects play the well known Holt and Laury (2002) lottery
protocol to control for individual risk aversion.
A questionnaire collects additional information about our subjects at the end of the experiment.
Since the actual random occurrence of AW could be poorly informative from our research
point of view, we adopted different frequencies of almost winning: One generated randomly by
the software (in this case probability of a random almost winning is pAW = 18 given three cells
with probability of good state one half each) or forced such that the probability of almost win-
ning is, at least, pAW = 38 while the probability of winning is kept constant ph =
1
8 . Regardless
the almost winning frequency, instructions did not change since the other salient information
we provided was the winning probability in Stage 2A. To summarize the experimental protocol,
7Even if participants could ask questions individually to the experimenter after reading the instructions, very
few of them asked about the probability of winning and the experimenter was trained not to provide this kind of
information at that stage.
8At the beginning of the both stages a message appeared on the screen. In the probability stage, the message
simply states “Note that the probability of three bullish markets (three bars) is 18 ”. In the warning stage the
message at the beginning of the session states “Note that, if you nearly win in the previous round, i.e. two bullish
markets (two bars), it does not have any effect on the winning probability in future rounds ”
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Table 5.1: Experimental Structure
Session
11 2 31 4 5 6 7
Average Payment 15.10 9.05 16.93 12.00 10.46 13.95 12.55
Number of subjects 24 24 24 12 24 12 24
Framing
IG framing x x x x x
SM framing x x
Stage 1 (20 rounds)
No Information x x x x x x x
Stage 2 (20 rounds)
Probability (2A) x x x x
Warning (2B) x x x
Stage 3 (30 rounds)
Holt and Laury’s protcol x x x x x x x
AW
Forced AW x x x x
Notes: Experiment structure for each session.
1 These two sessions included an extra task at the end of the experiment, which is not analyzed in this work and did not affect the results of
the first stages.
see Table 5.1.
5.3. Results
In this section we present the main results focusing on different levels of analysis. In Sec-
tion 5.3.1 we start describing the variables collected through the experiment. Section 5.3.2 is
based on the analysis of the AW and framing biases, underlying the role of risk preferences.
The second step investigates the role of information, in particular whether informing on proba-
bilities or nudging is more relevant to weaken the AW effect (Section 5.3.3). We conclude with
robustness checks without relying on distributional assumptions, based on bootstrap procedure,
Section 5.3.4.
5.3.1. Descriptive Analysis
Table 5.2 summarizes the findings related to tokens allocation differences by game rules and
individual characteristics across stages. When we consider the first stage, the allocation of
tokens is not significantly different when we compare rounds right after AW outcomes and
those in which it didn’t occur, although AW frequency is significantly relevant: When we
force the frequency of AW, participants played significantly more. AW outcomes increase the
average allocation of tokens to the risky choice and when this is more frequent it is associated
to higher willingness to play, consistent with Cote et al. (2003) results.
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Table 5.2: Tokens allocated in the risky choice
Investment differences by Stages
Average investment
Stage 1 Stage 2A, Probability Stage 2B, Warning
Tokens allocated after an AW round 2.47 1.53 1.85
(1831) (1257) (616)
Tokens allocated in other rounds 2.40 1.50 1.26
(905) (567) (296)
WRT 0.11 0.01 0.00
Random AW1 2.50 1.66 1.22
(1440) (960) (480)
Forced AW1 2.93 1.59 2.05
(720) (480) (240)
WRT 0.00 0.18 0.01
SM2 1.99 1.08 1.66
(720) (480) (240)
IG2 2.93 1.59 2.05
(720) (480) (240)
WRT 0.00 0.90 0.81
Individual characteristics
Man 2.42 1.46 1.53
(1820) (1220) (600)
Women 2.58 1.58 1.55
(1060) (700) (360)
WRT: 0.00 0.02 0.69
Self evaluation on math capabilities: lower than average 3.23 1.41 3.46
(300) (200) (100)
Self evaluation on math capabilities: average 2.66 1.75 1.48
(1920) (1220) (700)
Self evaluation on math capabilities: higher than average 1.61 0.92 0.59
(660) (500) (160)
WRT: Low vs. Average 0.00 0.20 0.00
WRT: Average vs. High 0.00 0.00 0.00
Do you like betting: no 2.31 1.35 1.51
(1680) (1160) (520)
Do you like betting: yes 2.72 1.74 1.57
(1200) (760) (440)
WRT 0.05 0.50 0.49
Notes: All tests reported are two-sided Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRT). In parenthesis the number of observations.
1 comparison between investment game with and without forced almost winning.
2 We compare the Slot Machine Game and the Investment Game with forced AW outcomes.
We observe a significant difference between individuals playing the slot machine and the
investment game framing. On average, subjects invest more in IG framing rather than betting
on the classic slot machine.9 When we control for elicited beliefs on probability (the winning
probability they guessed at the end of Stage 1 when AW is more frequent) we find that there is
no difference across framings and treatments, as shown in Table D.1 in Appendix D.2.
When we look at individual characteristics we find that female subjects tend to invest on
average significantly more, as well as participants with lower math skills and those who enjoy
more to gamble.
When we control for the following stages, we find very similar results, although we want
to underline some interesting exceptions which can lead our regression analysis. In Stage
2A, probability knowledge provokes a severe drop in tokens allocated to the risky option, in
particular when AW frequency was forced. Stage 2B is consistent to observations made for
Stage 1. Awareness on winning probability and larger experience reduce the amount gambled
9We test the framing differences just with the sessions with forced almost winning, however, replicating the
test and including also the IG with no forced AW, the difference of tokens allocation holds: Tokens allocated in
the risky choice are greater in the investment game than the slot machine, regardless the AW frequency.
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in both framings,showing that subjects seem to be able to evaluate the actual probabilities of
winning.
The tokens allocated in the risky option increase when individuals are more inclined to
risk. The sample is quite heterogeneous, risk-seeking individuals (46.53% of the total sample)
tend to allocate an average of 2.67 tokens to the risky choice, which is higher compared to
the average tokens allocated by risk-neutral individuals (18.06% of the total sample allocates
just an average of 1.68 tokens to the risky option), and those showing risk averse preferences
(35.42%) allocate only 1.25 tokens on average.
The individual decision on tokens allocation in Stage 1 is analyzed in Table 5.3 looking at
the risk attitude. Risk averse individuals invest significantly more in the risky choice after an
AW outcome and in those sessions where AW was more frequent, while instead risk-seeking
individuals are consistent on their investment choice regardless the occurrence and frequency
of AW outcomes.
On the other hand, risk seeking individuals invest significantly more in the IG framing than
betting in the SM one: Individuals showing risk aversion are more consistent across framings.
Table 5.3: Tokens allocated in Stage 1 by risk averse/neutral/seeking individuals
Average tokens allocation in Stage 1
Risk Risk Risk Wilcoxon rank-sum Wilcoxon rank-sum
Averse Neutral Seeking (R. Averse vs.Neutral) (R. Neutral vs. Seeking)
Tokens allocated after an AW round 1.76 2.32 3.12 0.00 0.08
(319) (186) (400)
Tokens allocated in other rounds 1.56 1.90 3.20 0.00 0.00
(650) (308) (873)
WRT 0.01 0.02 0.77
Random AW1 1.66 1.82 3.44 0.01 0.00
(580) (200) (660)
Forced AW1 2.17 2.20 3.53 0.96 0.00
(200) (120) (400)
WRT 0.00 0.63 0.33
SM2 1.42 2.22 2.31 0.00 0.07
(240) (200) (280)
IG2 2.17 2.20 3.53 0.96 0.00
(200) (120) (400)
WRT 0.30 0.06 0.00
Man 1.72 2.09 3.18 0.00 0.00
(700) (340) (780)
Women 1.67 1.99 3.30 0.02 0.00
(320) (180) (560)
WRT 0.40 0.96 0.02
Self evaluation on math capabilities: lower than average 1.08 2.38 4.23 0.00 0.00
(60) (60) (180)
Self evaluation on math capabilities: average 2.01 2.47 3.19 0.00 0.01
(660) (340) (920)
Self evaluation on math capabilities: higher than average 1.17 0.73 2.61 0.14 0.00
(300) (120) (240)
WRT: Low vs. Average 0.04 0.64 0.00
WRT: Average vs. High 0.00 0.00 0.00
Do you like betting: no 1.50 2.15 2.99 0.00 0.00
(600) (300) (780)
Do you like betting: yes 2.00 1.93 3.57 0.21 0.00
(420) (220) (560)
WRT 0.04 0.22 0.03
Notes: Risk preferences were inferred by the Holt and Laury’s lotteries chosen in the third session of the experiment. All tests reported are two-sided Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRT). In
parenthesis the number of observations.
1 comparison between investment game with and without forced almost winning.
2 We compare the Slot Machine Game and the Investment Game whit forced AW outcomes.
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Table 5.3 considers also the individual characteristics which we include as controls in our
analysis: Females and males showing risk averse attitude allocate a similar amount of tokens
to the risky option, while females showing risk-loving preferences are more willing to play
riskier than male participants. Risk-loving individuals who poorly self evaluate their math skills
tend to play significantly more. Enjoyment of gambling rises significantly with the average
allocation of tokens to the risky option regardless of risk preferences.
These results are stressing the importance of risk preferences in this experiment, in particular
risk attitude weakens or strengthens different cognitive bias provided by our experimental
setting.
When we look at the individual allocation across stages and periods (Appendix D.2, Fig-
ure D.8 - Figure D.13) risk-averse subjects are characterized by a smoother-path, tending
to zero token allocation to the risky choice, while positive investment to the risky option is
more frequent when individuals are risk seeking. This result does confirm that risk lovers play
more than the risk averse although it does not clarify who is more likely to be affected by AW
outcomes.
5.3.2. AW Effect and Framing Effect
The descriptive analysis pointed out unexpected differences in tokens allocation when we
consider risk preferences and that subjects tend to gamble more when they face the IG framing.
The analysis focuses on both effects in particular the relationship between the allocation of
tokens in the risky option in each round and the almost-winning outcome in previous rounds,
controlling by possible framing and individual characteristics. We focus on the analysis of the
first stage, where individuals have the same information. In particular, we implement the basic
model:
yit = α+β1awit−1+β2igi+β3tit + γ ′Xit−1+δ ′Zi+ui+ εit (5.2)
i = 1, ...,144, t = 2, ...,20
Where yit is the amount of tokens allocated to the risky option, awit−1 is a dummy variable
equal to 1 when AW outcome occurred in the previous period, while ig is the dummy referring
to the investment game. We control for the period t and Xit−1, the outcome in the previous
round associated to winning trials. Finally, we include some individual controls, such as gender,
risk preferences, betting pleasure and self evaluation on math capabilities.
Table 5.4 collects the results of five specifications with an increasing number of control variables.
In specification (1) and (2) we consider only the AW, framing effect and time: Tokens allocation
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Table 5.4: Almost Winning effect on token’s allocation in Stage 1
Token allocation in risky choice, Stage 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
L.AW 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.31* 0.31
(0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19)
Tr IG 0.92 0.45 0.50
(0.78) (0.64) (0.63)
TrSM*L.AW=0 -0.73
(0.68)
TrIG*L.AW=0 -0.49**
(0.23)
TrSM*L.AW=1 -0.80
(0.67)
Round -0.15*** -0.15*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Winning * L.Payoff 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
L.Winning -4.24*** -4.23*** -4.27***
(0.82) (0.82) (0.82)
L.Payoff -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Risk1 0.42*** 0.35*** 0.35***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Female -0.00 0.00
(0.57) (0.57)
Self evaluation on math capabilities2 -1.61*** -1.61***
(0.49) (0.49)
Do you like betting?3 0.78 0.78
(0.56) (0.56)
Constant 2.36*** 1.66** 1.97** 4.65*** 5.59***
(0.38) (0.70) (0.99) (1.57) (1.63)
Constant(σu) 3.93*** 3.91*** 3.14*** 3.01*** 3.01***
(0.27) (0.27) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
Constant (σe) 3.60*** 3.60*** 3.54*** 3.54*** 3.54***
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Observations 2736 2736 2736 2736 2736
ρ 0.54 0.54 0.44 0.42 0.42
Nlc 1126 1126 1126 1126 1126
Nrc 183 183 183 183 183
σe 3.60 3.60 3.54 3.54 3.54
σu 3.93 3.91 3.14 3.01 3.01
Notes: Panel tobit regressions with random effects, censored at 0 and 10. Stage 1 from all sessions are included in this analysis.
1 The risk is measured from 0 (max. risk averse) to 10 (max. risk lover).
2 In the questionnaire we asked "How do you consider your math capabilities?" The answers were Lower than Average (10.42 %), On Average (66.67%), Higher than the Average (22.92%)
3 Dummy variable for Yes and No, in the questionnaire we asked "Do you like to bet?"
(* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
is significantly decreasing through time and positively related to almost winning outcomes:
in particular seeing an AW increase of 0.5 for the average allocation to the risky option. IG
framing coefficient is positive although not significant. Controlling for past outcomes and
individual characteristics (model (3) and (4)) weaken the effect of AW but it remains positive
on investment of the next round: Rather than simple multicollinearity between exogenous
variables, we might focus on possible heterogeneity among individuals. Specification (5) of
Table 5.4 checks the interaction between AW outcomes and framing effect with respect to
the benchmark, the lagged AW outcome in IG framing: We conclude that AW outcomes are
equally perceived in both framings, and significantly higher compared to lagged period without
AW in the IG framing.
If the AW outcomes affect the pool of individuals recruited for this experiment which is not
strictly related to compulsive behavior in gambling, we might claim that individuals are willing
to play more when they see AW outcomes regardless of compulsiveness. Experience decreases
the tokens allocated in the risky option while it is positively related to interaction between
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winning periods and payoff which means that winning tokens through risky option increases
the willingness to play. Risk increases betting and is consistent to the analysis carried before,
but the framing effect underlined in previous analysis is not significant. Table 5.4 includes
some individual characteristics: Gender is not a relevant variable, instead the self statement on
math capabilities is negatively correlated with playing more on the risky option.
Table 5.5: Almost-Winning effect on token’s allocation in Stage 1, by risk preferences
Token allocation in risky choice, Stage 1
Risk Averse Risk Neutral+Risk Seeking
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
L.AW 0.75** 0.55* 0.38* 0.17
(0.31) (0.31) (0.23) (0.24)
Tr IG -1.10 1.25
(1.11) (0.77)
TrSM*L.AW=0 0.62 -1.34
(1.18) (0.83)
TrIG*L.AW=0 -0.73* -0.37
(0.38) (0.28)
TrSM*L.AW=1 0.84 -1.60**
(1.15) (0.81)
Round -0.18*** -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
L.Winning * L.Payoff 0.79*** 0.79*** 0.27*** 0.27***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.07)
L.Winning -8.52*** -8.57*** -2.81*** -2.84***
(1.51) (1.51) (0.99) (0.99)
L.Payoff -0.52*** -0.51*** -0.28*** -0.28***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Female 0.32 0.32 0.04 0.04
(0.92) (0.92) (0.69) (0.69)
Self evaluation on math capabilitie1s -0.85 -0.85 -1.89*** -1.89***
(0.76) (0.76) (0.61) (0.61)
Do you like betting?2 1.71* 1.72* 0.65 0.65
(0.98) (0.98) (0.68) (0.69)
Constant 1.11* 5.31** 4.87* 3.10*** 7.18*** 8.74***
(0.61) (2.16) (2.52) (0.45) (1.66) (1.62)
Constant (σu) 3.71*** 2.67*** 2.67*** 3.74*** 3.03*** 3.03***
(0.45) (0.36) (0.36) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28)
Constant (σe) 3.31*** 3.21*** 3.21*** 3.71*** 3.66*** 3.65***
(0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Observations 969 969 969 1767 1767 1767
ρ 0.56 0.41 0.41 0.50 0.41 0.41
Nlc 502.00 502.00 502.00 624.00 624.00 624.00
Nrc 42.00 42.00 42.00 141.00 141.00 141.00
σe 3.31 3.21 3.21 3.71 3.66 3.65
σu 3.71 2.67 2.67 3.74 3.03 3.03
Notes: Panel tobit regressions with random effects, censored at 0 and 10. Stage 1 from all sessions are included in this analysis.
1 In the questionnaire we asked "How do you consider your math capabilities?" The answers were Lower than Average (10.42 %), On Average (66.67%), Higher than the Average (22.92%)
2 Dummy variable for Yes and No, in the questionnaire we asked "Do you like to bet?"
(* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
It is reasonable to think that subjects have different perceptions toward AW outcomes: Some
of them could be more affected. We have individuals who prefer to adopt a safe strategy and to
allocate zero tokens to the risky option, and others enjoying the possibility to bet constantly
some positive amount. Our previous results already cast some light on differences among these
two groups, and a big role is played by risk attitude. On the other hand, descriptive analysis
pointed out that risk averse individuals are more likely to increase their bet after seeing the AW
outcome (see Table 5.3)
When we carry the analysis dividing the sample in groups with different risk attitude, the
AW effect is significantly relevant only for risk-averse individuals (see Table 5.5). Subjects
showing risk aversion are consistent to the analysis made: Their investment in the risky option
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significantly decreases over time, while lagged payoffs have a positive effect when interacted
with winning rounds. Those who enjoy betting are indeed playing more, and framing effect
does not play any role. AW bias is significant regardless of the specification adopted, and when
we look at the interaction between AW and treatment, it becomes clear that the AW effect is
particularly relevant when we consider the investment game.10
Risk-seeking and neutral agents prefer to bet no matter what: Even though AW bias is
positive and significant in some specifications, the magnitude of the effect is significantly
smaller compared to the effect shown for risk-averse individuals. Framing is not significant
but when we check on the interaction between framing and almost winning, we noticed that
AW in investment game has a much stronger effect than the AW bias in a slot machine game.
Individuals do not invest significantly more by framing, but AW bias could be more often
misinterpreted in such context. Although self evaluation on math capabilities is irrelevant
for risk-averse individuals, when we consider risk-neutral and risk-seeking ones, it becomes
negatively (and significantly) related to tokens bet.
5.3.3. Warning or Nudging: This Is The Question
The second stage of both treatments is aimed to check how people are changing their gambling
choices. Results from the first stage points out the role of risk attitude in reacting to AW
cognitive bias; the second stage should help subjects to correctly interpret the game and the
meaning of AW outcomes.
From the policy-maker perspective, results discussed in Section5.3.2 stress the role of risk
attitude on the kind of “player”wrongly perceiving the AW bias. AW outcomes are tricks which
promote a riskier behavior for those individuals which naturally prefer not to gamble.
The second stage is aimed to find the more effective way to help agents to correctly interpret
the role of AW biases: We discuss the persistence in playing, but we are mainly interested if
the AW bias is weakened by different information. Individuals were either informed about
probabilities of winning or about the cognitive bias lying behind the AW outcome. We are
basically investigating how individuals change their approach when either informed or nudged.
Figure 5.1 can help to understand the average tokens allocation after information: Individuals
knowing winning probabilities allocates significantly less tokens than the others. In Stage 2A,
knowing the winning probability reduces suddenly the betting level; they review their winning
expectations and decide to minimize their tokens allocation to the risky option (also the optimal
solution of this game, discussed in Appendix D.1). After a first moment of disappointment, last
periods of the Stage 2A are characterized by an increase in tokens allocated to the risky option.
10Tokens allocated in the slot machine after an AW outcome is not significantly different from the other rounds.
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Figure 5.1: Allocation of tokens in Stage 2A and 2B
Notes: Kernel-weighted local polynomial smoothing with CI.
Players from Stage 2B, instead, are decreasing their bets smoothly. Last periods of both
stages are characterized by end game effect where individuals increase significantly the token
allocation to the risky option.
Table 5.6 represents the average investment through Stage 2A and Stage 2B. The results
are underlying that informing individuals on independence between rounds is not sufficient to
minimize the AW bias, while probabilities seem to have a stronger effect and individuals are
less sensitive to AW bias. In Stage 2B, even though subjects adapt through experience lowering
their investment in the risky choice, we show that warning per se is not very effective.
In Stage 2A, tokens allocation to the risky choice significant increases through time (the
effect is not linear, as we saw in Figure 5.1, but the overall effect is driven by the increasing
tokens allocation in the risky choices of last rounds); risk preferences are still playing a
(positive) role as well as past outcomes. In Stage 2B risk preferences and time are not relevant,
while higher math capabilities lower the willingness to play, even more sharply than what
observed in Stage 1.
Finally, Table 5.7 distinguishes between risk averse and the others (we jointly consider
risk-neutral and risk-seeking) in order to check which information was more relevant among
stages and risk preferences.
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Table 5.6: Almost-Winning effect on token’s allocation in Stage 2A and 2B
Token allocation in risky choice, Stage 2 and Stage 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
L.AW 0.53* 0.05 0.50** 0.54**
(0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.26)
Tr IG -0.54 0.38
(0.87) (1.31)
TrSM*L.AW=0 0.50 -0.93
(0.94) (1.35)
TrIG*L.AW=0 -0.20 -0.51*
(0.34) (0.31)
TrSM*L.AW=1 0.30 -0.33
(0.93) (1.34)
Round 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.06*** -0.04** -0.03 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
L.Winning * L.Payoff 0.64*** 0.65*** 0.27** 0.27**
(0.09) (0.09) (0.11) (0.11)
L.Winning -6.98*** -7.01*** -2.34* -2.33*
(1.13) (1.13) (1.30) (1.30)
L.Payoff -0.67*** -0.67*** -0.24*** -0.24***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Risk1 0.60*** 0.60*** 0.11 0.11
(0.19) (0.19) (0.21) (0.21)
Gender -0.32 -0.32 -0.23 -0.23
(0.80) (0.80) (1.13) (1.13)
Self evaluation on math capabilities2 -1.17* -1.17* -3.41*** -3.41***
(0.67) (0.67) (1.05) (1.05)
Do you like betting?3 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.17
(0.79) (0.79) (1.14) (1.14)
Constant -3.23*** 2.60 2.23 -0.77 7.17** 8.07**
(0.62) (2.36) (2.38) (0.68) (2.93) (3.32)
Constant(σu) 4.96*** 3.41*** 3.40*** 4.16*** 3.27*** 3.27***
(0.47) (0.35) (0.35) (0.56) (0.46) (0.46)
Constant(σe) 3.92*** 3.62*** 3.62*** 2.51*** 2.49*** 2.49***
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Observations 1824 1824 1824 912 912 912
ρ 0.61 0.47 0.47 0.73 0.63 0.63
Nlc 1101 1101 1101 488 488 488
Nrc 71 71 71 18 18 18
σe 3.92 3.62 3.62 2.51 2.49 2.49
σu 4.96 3.41 3.40 4.16 3.27 3.27
Notes: Panel tobit regressions with random effects, censored at 0 and 10. Stage 1 from all sessions are included in this analysis.
1 The risk is measured from 0 (max. risk averse) to 10 (max. risk lover).
2 In the questionnaire we asked "How do you consider your math capabilities?" The answers were Lower than Average (10.42 %), On Average (66.67%), Higher than the Average (22.92%)
3 Dummy variable for Yes and No, in the questionnaire we asked "Do you like to bet?"
(* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
AW outcomes are weakly affecting individual’s choices. Participants informed on winning
probabilities in Stage 2A, regardless their risk attitude, are immune to AW bias in particular
they tend to play even more safely in the investment game framing. Informing them on the
market probabilities shows them the real nature of the investment game, just related with luck
rather than knowledge on financial market. In Stage 2B, informing participants about the
independence of rounds helps the risk-averse subsample to change their behavior toward AW
outcomes; instead risk-seekers and risk-lovers positively and significantly allocate more tokens
to the risky option after seeing the AW bias in the IG framing. This result is very surprising, as
individuals showing risk averse preferences were more likely to be affected by AW outcomes,
but nudging helps them to correctly consider the past round as an independent event. At the
same time, risk-neutral and risk-seeking individuals decrease significantly the tokens allocated
compared to the first stage, but it is more likely to incur in the misrepresentation of AW
outcomes. When individuals play safer, the AW becomes more relevant.
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Table 5.7: Almost-Winning effect on token’s allocation in Stage 2A and 2B, by risk preferences
Token allocation in risky choice, Stage 2 and Stage 3
Stage 2A Stage 2B
Risk Averse Others Risk Averse Others
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
L.AW 0.34 -0.25 0.54 0.18 0.07 0.56 0.76** 0.55*
(0.52) (0.46) (0.34) (0.33) (0.38) (0.40) (0.31) (0.33)
Tr IG -2.79* 0.61 0.49 0.98
(1.46) (1.04) (2.27) (1.47)
TrSM*L.AW=0 2.93* -0.74 -1.19 -1.46
(1.59) (1.12) (2.29) (1.52)
TrIG*L.AW=0 -0.04 -0.31 -0.23 -0.71*
(0.71) (0.39) (0.47) (0.39)
TrSM*L.AW=1 2.49 -0.83 0.10 -1.23
(1.57) (1.10) (2.28) (1.51)
Round 0.16*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.06** 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Winning * L.Payoff 0.62*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.63*** 0.70*** 0.70*** 0.17 0.18
(0.20) (0.20) (0.10) (0.10) (0.22) (0.22) (0.13) (0.13)
L.Winning -7.66*** -7.69*** -6.34*** -6.38*** -6.25** -6.19** -2.48 -2.54
(2.28) (2.29) (1.31) (1.32) (2.62) (2.60) (1.60) (1.61)
L.Payoff -0.74*** -0.74*** -0.66*** -0.66*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.14* -0.15*
(0.13) (0.13) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08)
Male 0.30 0.34 -0.07 -0.08 -0.30 -0.29 -0.76 -0.73
(1.32) (1.32) (0.94) (0.93) (1.63) (1.61) (1.30) (1.30)
Self evaluation on math capabilities1 -1.42 -1.41 -0.96 -0.97 -1.62 -1.60 -5.32*** -5.30***
(1.04) (1.04) (0.80) (0.80) (1.71) (1.68) (1.26) (1.26)
Do you like betting?2 2.00 2.02 -0.26 -0.25 -0.96 -0.95 2.30* 2.28*
(1.43) (1.43) (0.93) (0.92) (2.05) (2.02) (1.29) (1.29)
Constant -5.59*** 5.80** 2.90 -1.94*** 6.41*** 7.29*** -1.73* 6.11 6.96 0.08 8.48*** 10.08***
(1.05) (2.88) (3.27) (0.71) (2.46) (2.29) (0.97) (5.07) (6.13) (0.89) (2.69) (3.04)
Constant(σu) 4.16*** 2.73*** 2.74*** 4.76*** 3.45*** 3.44*** 3.69*** 3.06*** 3.01*** 4.12*** 2.79*** 2.78***
(0.79) (0.57) (0.57) (0.52) (0.42) (0.42) (0.83) (0.72) (0.71) (0.70) (0.50) (0.50)
Constant(σe) 3.18*** 2.77*** 2.77*** 4.10*** 3.82*** 3.82*** 2.41*** 2.33*** 2.32*** 2.55*** 2.53*** 2.53***
(0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Observations 570 570 570 1254 1254 1254 399 399 399 513 513 513
ρ 0.63 0.49 0.49 0.57 0.45 0.45 0.70 0.63 0.63 0.72 0.55 0.55
Nlc 420.00 420.00 420.00 681.00 681.00 681.00 251.00 251.00 251.00 237.00 237.00 237.00
Nrc 8.00 8.00 8.00 63.00 63.00 63.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 14.00 14.00 14.00
σe 3.18 2.77 2.77 4.10 3.82 3.82 2.41 2.33 2.32 2.55 2.53 2.53
σu 4.16 2.73 2.74 4.76 3.45 3.44 3.69 3.06 3.01 4.12 2.79 2.78
Notes: Panel tobit regressions with random effects, censored at 0 and 10. Stage 1 from all sessions are included in this analysis.
1 In the questionnaire we asked "How do you consider your math capabilities?" The answers were Lower than Average (10.42 %), On Average (66.67%), Higher than the Average (22.92%)
2 Dummy variable for Yes and No, in the questionnaire we asked "Do you like to bet?"
(* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
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5.3.4. Robustness Check
Table 5.8: Robustness check by framing, information and AW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Token allocation in risky choice
Stage 1 Stage 2A Stage 2B
All RA RN+RS All RA RN+RS All RA RN+RS
β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se) β /(se)
L.AW 0.31 0.55* 0.17 0.05 -0.25 0.18 0.54** 0.56* 0.55
(0.19) (0.30) (0.25) (0.26) (0.37) (0.30) (0.24) (0.34) (0.34)
Tr IG 0.50** -1.10*** 1.25*** -0.54** -2.79*** 0.61* 0.38 0.49 0.98***
(0.20) (0.42) (0.24) (0.27) (0.70) (0.35) (0.26) (0.54) (0.37)
Round -0.12*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
L.Winning * L.Payoff 0.40*** 0.79*** 0.27*** 0.64*** 0.62** 0.63*** 0.27 0.70* 0.17
(0.08) (0.16) (0.10) (0.13) (0.27) (0.15) (0.17) (0.38) (0.19)
L.Winning -4.23*** -8.52*** -2.81** -6.98*** -7.66*** -6.34*** -2.34 -6.25 -2.48
(1.03) (1.80) (1.26) (1.43) (2.84) (1.66) (1.93) (4.66) (2.15)
L.Payoff -0.34*** -0.52*** -0.28*** -0.67*** -0.74*** -0.66*** -0.24** -0.39* -0.14
(0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.09) (0.21) (0.10) (0.11) (0.24) (0.13)
Risk1 0.35*** 0.60*** 0.11**
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
Male -0.00 0.32 0.04 -0.32 0.30 -0.07 -0.23 -0.30 -0.76**
(0.17) (0.30) (0.21) (0.25) (0.51) (0.30) (0.26) (0.41) (0.37)
Self evaluation on math capabilities2 -1.61*** -0.85*** -1.89*** -1.17*** -1.42*** -0.96*** -3.41*** -1.62*** -5.32***
(0.18) (0.29) (0.21) (0.24) (0.48) (0.31) (0.35) (0.37) (0.65)
Do you like betting?3 0.78*** 1.71*** 0.65*** 0.20 2.00** -0.26 0.17 -0.96* 2.30***
(0.18) (0.41) (0.20) (0.26) (0.93) (0.30) (0.30) (0.55) (0.51)
Constant 4.65*** 5.31*** 7.18*** 2.60** 5.80** 6.41*** 7.17*** 6.11*** 8.48***
(0.69) (1.24) (0.65) (1.27) (2.38) (1.28) (0.90) (2.31) (0.77)
Constant(σu) 3.01*** 2.67*** 3.03*** 3.41*** 2.73*** 3.45*** 3.27*** 3.06*** 2.79***
(0.14) (0.25) (0.17) (0.24) (0.51) (0.29) (0.27) (0.48) (0.31)
Constant(σe) 3.54*** 3.21*** 3.66*** 3.62*** 2.77*** 3.82*** 2.49*** 2.33*** 2.53***
(0.11) (0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (0.25) (0.20) (0.17) (0.30) (0.19)
Observations 2736 969 1767 1824 570 1254 912 399 513
ρ 0.42 0.41 0.41 0.47 0.49 0.45 0.63 0.63 0.55
Nlc 1126.00 502.00 624.00 1101.00 420.00 681.00 488.00 251.00 237.00
Nrc 183.00 42.00 141.00 71.00 8.00 63.00 18.00 4.00 14.00
σe 3.54 3.21 3.66 3.62 2.77 3.82 2.49 2.33 2.53
σu 3.01 2.67 3.03 3.41 2.73 3.45 3.27 3.06 2.79
Notes: Estimation bootstrapping with 999 repetition, standard errors in parenthesis.
Panel tobit regressions with random effects, censored at 0 and 10. Stage 1 from all sessions are included in this analysis.
1 The risk is measured from 0 (max. risk averse) to 10 (max. risk lover).
2 In the questionnaire we asked "How do you consider your math capabilities?" The answers were Lower than Average (10.42 %), On Average (66.67%), Higher than the Average (22.92%)
3 Dummy variable for Yes and No, in the questionnaire we asked "Do you like to bet?"
(* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01) (* 0.1, ** 0.05, *** 0.01)
In order to provide a robust test of our results on framing, AW outcomes and information,
without relying on distributional assumptions, we adopt the Bootstrap procedure. Table 5.8
proposes a summary of the analysis carried out.
Results from Table 5.8 confirm our previous analysis and some additional considerations might
be done. AW outcomes are affecting particularly risk-averse subjects in Stage 1, while the
coefficients from Stage 2A confirm that the effect completely disappear. In Stage 2B, AW effect
is statistically significant for all individuals, confirming that nudging is not the best option to
teach individuals how to face AW bias.
Thank to the Bootstrap method we find a significant trend toward framing: Risk-averse individ-
uals tend to invest more in the SM game, while risk-loving and risk-neutral individuals invest
1.25 tokens more (on average) on the risky choice when playing the investment game. This
last trend is weakened by information stages. Finally, self evaluation on math capabilities are
always negatively related to higher allocations of tokens to the risky choice, while people who
like betting tend to play more in Stage 1.
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5.4. Final Remarks
This work started as an attempt to study AW biases considering different frames and informa-
tion, and the analysis got even more interesting when results pointed out that the AW bias was
strengthened by these additional elements. We show through this experiment that the effect of
near-misses is not only related to compulsive gamblers and with pure gambling environments,
it is also related to in general agents who do not apply their knowledge of randomness in a
game of chance and therefore develop irrational thinking. Our result underlines that individuals
are more confident in investing larger shares of their endowment in the investment game, either
driven by a possible bias which increased their overconfidence or they could have different
sensation-seeking and arousal depending on the game proposed (Anderson and Brown 1984,
Ladouceur et al. 1991, Odean 1998). As described by Langer (1975), in skill situations people
try to behave as if they are maximizing the probability of success; choosing the strategy which
should lead to the best outcome is a primary component of the skill game, and those related
game skills may be responsible for the illusion of control.
In this sense, individuals playing in the IG framing are overestimating their probability of
success, given that the financial market is mostly associated to investment abilities, but their
bias toward AW is similar both in slot machine and investment game framings. When we
test the role of information on AW effect we conclude that providing different information
promotes agents’ rational behavior, in particular winning probabilities help them to correctly
perceive the cognitive bias related to almost winning outcomes and it induces a rational and
safer behavior in participants right after informing them. Warning them on the cognitive bias
due to AW outcomes induces a decreasing level of betting throughout the rounds, but this
passage is smoother compared to individuals aware of the winning probability.
100
Bibliography
[1] Anderson, G., & Brown, R. I. F. (1984). Real and laboratory gambling, sensation seeking
and arousal. British Journal of Psychology, 75(3), 401-410.
[2] Benhsain, K., Taillefer, A., & Ladouceur, R. (2004). Awareness of independence of events
and erroneous perceptions while gambling. Addictive Behaviors, 29(2), 399-404.
[3] Camerer, C. F., Loewenstein, G., & Prelec, D. (2004). Neuroeconomics: Why economics
needs brains. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(3), 555-579. Chicago
[4] Chase, H.W. and Clark, L. (2010), “Gambling severity predicts midbrain response to
near-miss outcomes”, The Journal of Neurosciences, 30 (18),6180-6187.
[5] Cote, D., Caron, A., Aubert J., Desrochers, R. and Ladouceur, R. (2003), “Near wins
prolongs gambling on a video lottery terminal”, Journal of Gambling Studies, 19 (4),433-
438.
[6] Coulombe, A., Ladouceur, R., Desharnais, R. and Jobin, J. (1992), “ Erroneous perceptions
and arousal among regular and occasional video poker players”, Journal of Gambling
Studies, 8(3),235-244.
[7] Coventry, K. R., & Hudson, J. (2001). Gender differences, physiological arousal and the
role of winning in fruit machine gamblers. Addiction, 96(6), 871-879.
[8] Dillon, R. L., & Tinsley, C. H. (2008). How near-misses influence decision making under
risk: A missed opportunity for learning. Management Science, 54(8), 1425-1440.
[9] Dixon,M., Harrigan, K. A., Sandhu, R., Collins, K. and Fugelsang, J. A. (2010), “Losses
disguised as wins in modern multi-line video slot machines”, Addiction, 105 (10), 1819-
1824.
[10] Fischbacher, U. “Z-tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-Made Economic Experiments.” Work-
ing Paper 21. Switzerland: University of Zurich, 1999
101
[11] Greiner, B. (2004). An online recruitment system for economic experiments.
[12] Griffiths, M. D. (1994). The role of cognitive bias and skill in fruit machine gambling.
British Journal of Psychology, 85(3), 351-369.
[13] Holt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American
economic review, 92(5), 1644-1655.
[14] Odean, T. (1998). Do investors trade too much?. Available at SSRN 94143.
[15] Ladouceur, R., Gaboury, A., Bujold, A., Lachance, N., & Tremblay, S. (1991). Ecological
validity of laboratory studies of videopoker gaming. Journal of Gambling Studies, 7(2),
109-116.
[16] Langer, E. J. (1975). The illusion of control. Journal of personality and social psychology,
32(2), 311. Chicago
[17] Myrseth, H., Brumborg, G.S. and Eidem, M. (2010), “Differences in cognitive distorsions
between pathological and not pathological gamblers with preferences for chance or skill
games, Journal of Gambling Studies, 26(4), 561-569.
[18] van Holst, R. J., van den Brink, W., Veltman, D. J., & Goudriaan, A. E. (2010). Why
gamblers fail to win: a review of cognitive and neuroimaging findings in pathological
gambling. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(1), 87-107.
102
Appendix D
Translated Instructions
Welcome to our experiment!
You are participating in an experiment in which you will make several economic decisions.
We are interested only to your decisions that will remain completely anonymous: this
means that the experimenters will not be able to associate any decisions to your name.
These decisions will directly affect your payment for the experiment. At the end og the
experiment you will be paid cash privately. In particular, in each stage of the experiment you
will gain several ECU (Experimental Currency Units) that will be exchanged at the following
rate:
1 ECU = 0.5 e
In this experiment you will take your decisions in different situations that we call “Stages”.
The experiment consists of three Stages and a final Questionnaire.
Each Stage includes different rounds. Each decision that you will make and the result
obtained in each Stage is independent from the others; this means that decisions taken in a
Stage do not affect your results in any other Stage of the experiment.
At the end of the experiment, the computer randomly selects one round for each Stage and
you will be paid the sum of the payoffs you realized in each round randomly selected.
In the following Instructions we will explain in details your task in each Stage.
After reading aloud the Instructions you will have some time to read them on your own. If
you have any doubt please raise your hand and wait: one experimenter will come and help you
individually as soon as she can. During the experiment work in silence and do not disturb other
participants.
Enjoy
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STAGE 1, Investment Game
In this Stage you have to decide how to invest your initial endowment for 20 rounds.
At the beginning of each round you will be endowed with 10 ECU and you have to allocate
them between a risk free investment and a risky investment, based on a portfolio of three
shares of three firms operating in independent markets, namely Microlift, Chip Corporation
and Dolltech that DO NOT exist in the reality.
The risk free investment gives a zero net gain return, i.e. what you will invest in it will be
entirely repaid to you no matter the trend of the three markets will be.
Your gain from the risky investment depends on the trend of the three markets. In particular,
when all the markets are characterized by a bullish trend your initial investment is tripled.
Whenever occurs one bear market you will experience a loss and your investment gain will be
equal to 1/10 of your initial investment.
Assume, as an example, that in a given round you decide to invest 5 ECU in the risk
free investment and 5 ECU in the risky investment. Your actual gain from this round will be
determined by the trend of the three markets and by the amount of your endowment allocated
to each investment. Since the repayment factor of the risk free investment is 1, you will gain 5
ECU for sure plus 15 ECU from the risky investment if all the 3 markets will have a positive
trend. On the contrary if one or more of the markets will have a doom your gain will be: 5
ECU from the risk free investment plus 0.5 ECU from the risky investment.
To illustrate your choice task, look at Figure D.1 where 5 ECU are invested in the risky
portfolio represented by the scroll bar cursor. The potential gains with three bullish markets is
represented in the green box; whether one market does not have a bullish trend, potential gains
are represented in the red box.
Figure D.1: Screenshot IG
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Remember, you can move the cursor of the scroll bar to know all possible outcomes before
confirming your final decision: you can check the potential results of your investment decision
by scrolling the cursor on the bar. When you decide your preferred allocation, click OK.
When you confirm the investment allocation, the computer will show the three markets
result. Figure D.2 and Figure D.3 show two possible examples of the result shown on the
screen. The final result of your investment is computed below the market outcomes, and it
computes the ECU gained in that round.
Figure D.2: Screenshot IG
Figure D.3: Screenshot IG
In each round of Stage 1 you will receive the same initial endowment, i. e. in each of them
you will have always 10 ECU to invest.
At the end of Stage one you will have also to answer to a question based on the 20 round
played that will give you the possibility to gain 4 extra ECU.
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At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage
1 and your actual gain from Stage 1 will be given by the amount of ECU you realized in that
round plus 4 Ecu depending on how you answered to the final question on Stage 1.
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STAGE 1, Slot Machine
In this Stage you have to decide how to bet your initial endowment for 20 rounds.
At the beginning of each round you will be endowed of 10 ECU and you will have to decide
how much of them to bet on a slot machine or to keep in your pockets. This is a one row
slot machine with three cells. The possible outcomes from the slot machine are the following:
“BAR”, “Cherry”, “Lemon”, “Pear”, “Strawberry”.
Your gain from bidding depends on the occurrence of the “BAR”. In particular, when
“BAR” occurs in all the cells your bet is tripled. Whenever occurs one or more cells different
from “BAR”, you will experience a loss and your gain will be equal to 1/10 of your initial bet.
At the beginning of each round you will be asked how much you want to bet; for any
possible choice (moving the cursor of the scrolling bar in Figure D.4) the computer will show
you in the green box your potential gain in case of winning (the occurrence of three “BAR”)
and your potential gain in RED box oherwise.
Figure D.4: Screenshot SM
When you confirm the investment allocation, the computer will show you the slot machine.
Assume, as an example, that in a given round you decide to bet 5 ECU in the slot machine
and to keep the remaining 5 ECU of your endowment in your pocket. Your actual gain from
this round will be determined by the 5 ECU you are not betting and by the slot machine result.
If 3 “BAR” will occur, as illustrate in Figure D.5, your payoff for the round will include the
5ECU you did not bet and 15 ECU from your bet that has been tripled. Otherwise, if one or
more than one icons will be different from “BAR” your payoff for the round will be equal to
the sum of the 5 ECU you did not bet plus 0.5 ECU (that is 1/10 of your initial bet), as shown
in Figure D.6.
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Figure D.5: Screenshot SM
Figure D.6: Screenshot SM
Remember, you can move the cursor of the scroll bar to know all possible outcomes before
confirming your final decision: you can check the potential results of your betting decision by
scrolling the cursor on the bar. When you decide your preferred allocation, click OK.
In each round of Stage 1 you will receive the same initial endowment, i. e. in each of them
you will have always 10 ECU to bet.
At the end of Stage one you will have also to answer to a question based on the 20 round
played that will give you the possibility to gain 4 extra ECU.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage
1 and your actual gain from Stage 1 will be given by the amount of ECU you realized in that
round plus 4 Ecu depending on how you answered to the final question on Stage 1.
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STAGE II, Investment Game (Stage 2A, Probability)
Stage 2 presents the same structure of Stage 1. During this Stage you will take the same
investment decisions between a risk free and a risky investment with an initial endowment of
10 ECU for 20 rounds.
Additionally to the information of Stage 1, in this Stage 2 the computer communicates you
the probability that the three markets have a bullish trend for all rounds.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage 2
for payment and your actual gain for this Stage will be determined by the amount of ECU you
realized in the selected round.
STAGE II, Investment Game (Stage 2B, Warning)
Stage 2 presents the same structure of Stage 1. During this Stage you will take the same
investment decisions between a risk free and a risky investment with an initial endowment of
10 ECU for 20 rounds.
Additionally to the information of Stage 1, in this Stage 2 the computer communicates you
a warning message related to the probability that the three markets have a bullish trend in the
following round.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage 2
for payment and your actual gain for this Stage will be determined by the amount of ECU you
realized in the selected round.
STAGE II, Slot Machine (Stage 2A, Probability)
Stage 2 presents the same structure of Stage 1. During this Stage you will asked to bid in a
slot machine with an initial endowment of 10 ECU for 20 rounds.
Additionally to the information of Stage 1, in this Stage 2 the computer communicates you
the actual probability of the occurrence of 3 “BAR” for all rounds.
At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage 2
for payment and your actual gain for this Stage will be determined by the amount of ECU you
realized in the selected round.
STAGE II, Slot Machine (Stage 2B, Warning)
Stage 2 presents the same structure of Stage 1. During this Stage you will asked to bid in a
slot machine with an initial endowment of 10 ECU for 20 rounds.
Additionally to the information of Stage 1, in this Stage 2 the computer communicates you
a warining message related to the probability that three “BAR” occur in the following round.
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At the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select just one round of Stage 2
for payment and your actual gain for this Stage will be determined by the amount of ECU you
realized in the selected round.
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STAGE III
In this Stage you wil be asked to choose between lotteries with different prizes and chances
of winning. You will be presented with a series of 10 lotteries where you will make choice
between pairs of them.
For each pair of lotteries, you should indicate which of the two lotteries you prefer to
play. You will actually get the chance to play one of the lotteries you choose, and will be paid
according to the outcome of that lottery, so you should think carefully about which lotteries
you prefer.
Figure 1ìD.7is an example of what the computer display of such a pair of lotteries will look
like. The display on your screen will be bigger and easier to read.
Figure D.7: Lottery
Each lottery assigns a given probability (indicated by the corresponding slice) to win 4
different prizes, respectively: 0.3 ECU, 3 ECU, 5 Ecu and 8.5 ECU represented by the area of
the corresponding colour that will remain the same during the 10 rounds.
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In the above example the probability that the LEFT lottery pays 3 ECU is associated to
the green colour area; the same probability is associated in the RIGHT lottery to a prize of
0.3 ECU. The probability that the lottery on the LEFT (RIGHT) pays respectively 5 ECU (8.5
ECU) is associated to the RED area.
Each pair of lotteries is shown on a separate screen on the computer. On each screen, you
should indicate which of the lotteries you prefer to play by clicking on one of the two boxes
beneath the lotteries. You should click the LEFT box if you prefer the lottery on the left, the
RIGHT box if you prefer the lottery on the right.
Be careful: You should approach each pair of lotteries as if it is the one out of the 10 that
you will play out, since at the end of the experiment the computer will randomly select one of
the 10 rounds and you will play for real the lottery you selected in that round.
After you have worked through all of the pairs of lotteries, wait in silence that all participants
end that Stage too. There is no reason to rush into, we will wait for everyone taking his/her
choices.
At the end of the experiment the computer will select one of the 10 rounds and it will play
for real the lottery that you have chosen in that run: a spinning device will appear on your
screen on a “wheel of fortune”. Note that each round has the same probability to be selected.
Once the computer will select the round to be implemented on your screen will appear the
corresponding lottery pair with in evidence the one you choose in that round.
Assume, for the sake of an example, that you preferred, as shown above, the lottery on your
LEFT. On it will appear a random device:
• if it will stops in the GREEN AREA you will gain 3 ECU for this Stage;
• if it will stops in the RED AREA you will gain 5 ECU for this Stage.
Summing up your payoff for this Stage is determined by 3 elements:
• which of the 10 rounds will be selected for payment;
• which lottery you preferred in that round (LEFT or RIGHT);
• the result of the random draws in the selected lottery.
YOUR PAYOFF FROM THE EXPERIMENT
Your final payoff from the experiment is given by the sum of the payoffs you gained in each
Stage of the experiment More in details:
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• your gain for the randomly selected round in Stage 1;
• 4 Ecu in case you answered correctly to the question proposed at the end of Stage 1 and
0 ECU otherwise;
• your gain for the randomly selected round in Stage 2;
• your gain for the randomly selected lottery in Stage 3.
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D.1. Maximization Problem
We represent the utility function as:
U(x1,h, l, ph, pl,e) = ph ·u(h · x1)+ pl ·u(l · x1)+u(e− x1) (D.1)
We keep general risk preference for the maximization, and the following maximization problem
is:
max
x1
phu(h · x1)+ plu(l · x1)+u(e− x1) (D.2)
s.t. x1 ≥ 0
e− x1 ≥ 0
and the lagrange form with λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0:
L(x1,λ1,λ2) = phu(h · x1)+ plu(l · x1)+u(e− x1)+λ1(x1)+λ2(e− x1) (D.3)
where FOC:
∂L
∂x1
= 0 (D.4)
phh ·u′(hx1)+ pll ·u′(lx1)−u′(e− x1)+λ1−λ2 = 0
Then, we optimize for the different values assumed by λ1 and λ2
1. When λ1 = λ2 = 0, x1 > 0 and e− x1 > 0
phh ·u′(hx1)+ pll ·u′(lx1) = u′(e− x1) (D.5)
phh ·u′(hx1)+(1− ph)l ·u′(lx1) = u′(e− x1) (D.6)
ph(h ·u′(hx1)− l ·u′(lx1)) = u′(e− x1)− l ·u′(lx1) (D.7)
ph =
u′(e− x1)− l ·u′(lx1)
(h ·u′(hx1)− l ·u′(lx1) (D.8)
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2. When λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0, x1 = 0
phh ·u′(hx1)+ pll ·u′(lx1)+λ1 = u′(e− x1) (D.9)
ph =
u′(e− x1)− l ·u′(lx1)−λ1
h ·u′(hx1)− l ·u′(lx1) (D.10)
3. When λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0 implies x1 = e
phh ·u′(hx1)+ pll ·u′(lx1)−λ2 = u′(e− x1) (D.11)
ph =
u′(e− x1)− l ·u′(lx1)+λ2
h ·u′(hx1)− l ·u′(lx1) (D.12)
When we consider the linear case for risk neutral individuals, we obtain:
1. When λ1 = λ2 = 0
ph =
1− l
h− l (D.13)
Then we know that ph < 1, then:
1− l
h− l < 1 (D.14)
h > 1 (D.15)
In this case each allocation of x1 would be the optimal choice.
2. When λ1 > 0 and λ2 = 0
ph =
1− l−λ1
h− l (D.16)
where λ1 > 1−h
3. When λ1 = 0 and λ2 > 0
ph =
1− l+λ2
h− l (D.17)
where λ2 < 1−h.
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D.2. Figures and Tables
Table D.1: Elicited beliefs on probabilities by Stage and framing
Guessed probability of winning
Slot Machine Investment Game SM+IG WRT
Stage 2A 14.029 16.392 15.210 0.817
(24) (24) (48)
Stage 2B 17.158 12.983 15.071 0.157
(12) (12) (24)
Stage 2 (A+B) 15.072 15.256 15.164 0.305
(36) (36) (72)
WRT 0.176 0.758 0.488
Notes: All tests reported are two-sided Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test (WRT). In parenthesis the number of observations. We consider only
sessions were AW were forced and so more frequent.
116
Figure D.8: Allocation of tokens, risk seeking individuals, Random AW
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Figure D.9: Allocation of tokens, risk seeking individuals, Forced AW
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Figure D.10: Allocation of tokens, risk neutral individuals, Random AW
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Figure D.11: Allocation of tokens, risk neutral individuals, Forced AW
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Figure D.12: Allocation of tokens, risk averse individuals, Random AW
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Figure D.13: Allocation of tokens, risk averse individuals, Forced AW
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